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WHO OWNS ‘hillary.com’? 
POLITICAL SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CYBERSPACE 
 
JACQUELINE D. LIPTON* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In the lead-up to the next presidential election, it will be important for candidates 
both to maintain an online presence and to exercise control over bad faith uses of 
domain names and web content related to their campaigns.  What are the legal 
implications for the domain name system?  Although, for example, Senator Hillary 
Clinton now owns ‘hillaryclinton.com’, the more generic ‘hillary.com’ is registered 
to a software firm, Hillary Software, Inc.  What about ‘hillary2008.com’? It is 
registered to someone outside the Clinton campaign and is not currently in active 
use.  This article examines the large gaps and inconsistencies in current domain 
name law and policy as to domain name use in the political context.  Current 
domain name policy is focused on protecting trademark uses of domain names 
against bad faith commercial ‘cybersquatters’.  It does not deal with protecting 
important uses of domain names as part of the political process.  This article 
identifies the current problems with Internet domain name policy in the political 
context and makes recommendations for developing clearer guidelines for uses of 
political domain names.  In so doing, it creates a new categorization system for 
different problems confronting the political process in cyberspace, including: (a) 
socially and economically wasteful political ‘cybersquatting’; (b) politicial 
‘cyberfraud’ which might involve conduct such as registering a politician’s name 
as a domain name to promulgate a misleading message about the politician; and, 
(c) competition between politicians’ names and competing trademark interests. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Who owns ‘hillary.com’?  Or ‘obama.com’?  Or ‘guiliani.com’?  How important 
might some of these names be in the lead-up to the next presidential election?  If past 
history is anything to go by, they could be extremely important, and valuable – as John 
Kerry found out the hard way after naming John Edwards as his running mate in 2004.  
The ‘kerryedwards.com’ domain name was already registered to a Mr Kerry Edwards 
who attempted to auction it to the highest bidder throughout the course of the 2004 
presidential election.1  Internet domain names are becoming increasingly important in 
political campaigns to identify political websites both for fundraising purposes, and to 
disseminate information about relevant policy issues.  An Internet presence is now 
invaluable for a politician.  The Internet can be used to reach an audience on a scale never 
before possible for a fraction of the cost of other media conduits.  In some respects this 
potentially levels the playing field for politicians and political commentators alike 
regardless of their fund raising abilities.  
                                                 
1
  See Nobody Wants Kerryedwards.Com, August 3, 2004 (last viewed on March 14, 2007, and 
available at http://www.networkworld.com/weblogs/layer8/005859.html ) (discussing attempt by Mr Kerry 
Edwards to auction the domain name kerryedwards.com to the highest bidder during the course of the 2004 
presidential election). 
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However, an Internet presence with an easy-to-guess and easy-to-recognize 
domain name can cause problems for politicians.  Many of the problems stem from the 
fact that the current Internet domain name regulation system is largely premised on 
protecting commercial trademark interests in domain names,2 and not on protecting 
political interests.3  There are significant gaps in the law when it comes to the use of 
domain names in politics.  Particularly during a political campaign, it is important that 
those wishing to use available media to discuss candidates and their views should be able 
to do so in the least socially misleading and least economically wasteful way possible.  
There are no clear rules about how domain names, particularly those corresponding to 
politicians’ names, may be legitimately used in the political process.  Conversely, there 
are no clear rules prohibiting socially wasteful or blatantly misleading use of political 
domain names. 
 
The current domain name regulation system is focused on preventing trademark-
based cybersquatting.  ‘Cybersquatting’ in this context has been described as 
speculatively purchasing a domain name with the intention of selling it for a profit4 – 
usually with respect to a well-known name corresponding with a trademark.5  Application 
of current laws to prevent misleading or wasteful registrations and uses of political 
domain names is limited in two ways.  The first is that it will only protect trademarked, 
and therefore trademarkable, political domain names, and the second is that it will only 
protect those names against bad faith cybersquatting.  These are serious limitations.  
Many policitican’s names will not be trademarkable6 and much of the abusive conduct 
that arises in an electoral context involves misleading content on a political website rather 
than an attempt to sell a particular political domain name for a profit. 
 
This article makes several important contributions to the debate on facilitating 
effective political speech in cyberspace.  The first is to create a novel categorization 
scheme for the various types of domain name registrations that may cause problems for 
politicians.  The development of this categorization scheme is essential in the political 
context.  In fact, the lack of a categorization system in the trademark context has caused 
                                                 
2
  Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting:  Taking Domain Names Past Trademark Policy, 40 
WAKE FOREST L R 1361, 1363 (2005).  (“[T]he current dispute resolution mechanisms [for domain name 
disputes] are focused on the protection of commercial trademark interests, often to the detriment of other 
socially important interests that may inhere in a given domain name.”) 
 
3
  id, 1425-1431 (discussion of the gaps in current regulations in the political context). 
 
4
  Ira Nathenson, Showdown at the Domain Name Corral:  Property Rights and Personal 
Jurisdiction over Squatters, Poachers and Other Parasites, 55 U PITT L REV 911, 925-926 (1997). 
 
5
  “Cybersquatting” is currently defined in the Wikipedia as:  “is registering, trafficking in, or using 
a domain name with bad-faith intent to profit from the goodwill of a trademark belonging to someone else. 
The cybersquatter then offers to sell the domain to the person or company who owns a trademark contained 
within the name at an inflated price.”  (last viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cybersquatter). 
 
6
  Generally, personal names are not registrable as trademarks:  15 U.S.C. § 1052 (c).  See also 
GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, ¶ 2.03[d]. 
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many problems of development and interpretation of the domain name regulationsystem 
in recent years.7  A second important aim of this article is to identify the limitations of the 
current domain name system in the political context and to suggest options for future 
development that would better accommodate the needs of the political process in 
cyberspace. 
 
Part I deals with situations that may be labeled ‘political cybersquatting’ where a 
registrant with no personal connection to a relevant name has registered it in order to sell 
it for profit to the relevant politician or another person.  Part II deals with conduct that 
may be labeled as ‘political cyberfraud’ in which an individual or political group registers 
a relevant domain name to promulgate a misleading message about a politician.  This 
category of conduct may coincide with cybersquatting in some contexts, but the legal 
issues raised by the two categories of conduct are quite different.  Part III deals with the 
more unusual situation involving competitions between trademark holders and politicians 
with similar names – for example, Hillary Software, Inc.8 and Senator Hillary Clinton if 
they both wanted the ‘hillary.com’ domain name.  Part IV provides conclusions and 
suggests options for future developments in political domain name regulation.   
 
II.  POLITICAL CYBERSQUATTING 
 
A.  POLITICIANS’ NAMES AND THE ANTI-CYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT 
 
Political cybersquatting may be defined as the political analog to traditional 
cybersquatting.  It would include registration and use of a domain name corresponding 
with a politician’s name with the intent to sell the domain name for a profit to the 
politician or to a third party.  While the conduct is similar – and similarly motivated – in 
both the trademark and the political contexts, different legal and theoretical issues arise.  
Traditional cybersquatting involves people registering often multiple domain names 
corresponding with registered trademarks with the intent to profit from selling the names 
to the relevant trademark holders or a third party.9  This conduct was originally 
prohibited under trademark infringement10 and dilution11 law.  Later, additional 
                                                 
7
  See, for example, discussion in Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks, and the First 
Amendment:  Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONNECTICUT L R 973 (2007); Jacqueline Lipton, 
Commerce vs Commentary:  Gripe Sites, Parody and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, forthcoming, 
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY L R, 2007; Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting:  Taking Domain Names 
Past Trademark Policy, 40 WAKE FOREST L R 1361 (2005). 
 
8
  The current holder of the ‘hillary.com’ domain name. 
 
9
  “Cybersquatting” is currently defined in the Wikipedia as:  “is registering, trafficking in, or using 
a domain name with bad-faith intent to profit from the goodwill of a trademark belonging to someone else. 
The cybersquatter then offers to sell the domain to the person or company who owns a trademark contained 
within the name at an inflated price.”  (last viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cybersquatter); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). 
 
10
  15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1) – statutory prohibitions against trademark infringement at the 
federal level for registered and common law marks respectively, premised on creation of consumer 
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regulatory measures were taken to proscribe this conduct.  In the United States, the Anti-
Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (‘ACPA’) was inserted into the Lanham Act12 
in 1999 to combat this conduct.  This legislation prohibits the practice of cybersquatting 
and sets out a number of ‘bad faith factors’13 that courts can use in determining whether 
or not particular conduct falls within the notion of a bad faith intent to profit from 
registration of a relevant domain name.   
 
At roughly the same time, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (‘ICANN’)14 adopted the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy 
(‘UDRP’)15 to achieve similar ends.  The UDRP has been extremely popular in practice 
because it is implemented under private contract between domain name registrants and 
domain name registrars16 and hence has a more global reach than domestic legislation.  It 
requires domain name registrants to submit to a mandatory arbitration procedure in the 
event that someone complains about a bad faith registration or use of a domain name.17  
The arbitrations are fast,18 inexpensive,19 and largely online procedures20 that can result 
                                                                                                                                                 
confusion as to source of relevant goods or services.  See also Planned Parenthood Federation of America 
v Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y., 11997) (for an example of the use of traditional trademark 
infringement law to prohibit unauthorized bad faith registration and use of a domain name corresponding 
with someone else’s registered trademark). 
 
11
  15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c),  1127 (federal statutory prohibitions on trademark dilution – the lessening 
of the capacity of a famous mark to identify or distinguish goods or services regardless of consumer 
confusion).  See also Panavision Int’l v Toeppen, 141 F 3d 1316 (9th Cir, 1998) (an example of a successful 
trademark dilution action against cybersquatting). 
 
12
  15 U.S.C. Chapter 22. 
 
13
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i). 
 
14
  The body that regulates the domain name system:  see www.icann.org for further information. 
 
15
  The full text of the UDRP is available at:  http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm  
(last viewed on March 14, 2007). 
 
16
  UDRP, clause 2 (“By applying to register a domain name, or by asking us to maintain or renew a 
domain name registration, you hereby represent and warrant to us that (a) the statements that you made in 
your Registration Agreement are complete and accurate; (b) to your knowledge, the registration of the 
domain name will not infringe upon or otherwise violate the rights of any third party; (c) you are not 
registering the domain name for an unlawful purpose; and (d) you will not knowingly use the domain name 
in violation of any applicable laws or regulations. It is your responsibility to determine whether your 
domain name registration infringes or violates someone else's rights.”) 
 
17
  UDRP, clause 4(a) (“You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in the 
event that a third party (a "complainant") asserts to the applicable Provider, in compliance with the Rules of 
Procedure, that:  (i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in 
which the complainant has rights; and (ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain 
name; and (iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.”) 
 
18
  A domain name arbitration will generally take less time than judicial proceedings, typically taking 
around two months for a decision to be issued.  See InterNic FAQs on the Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy (UDRP), last viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at:  
http://www.internic.net/faqs/udrp.html. 
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in transfer of a domain name to a rightful owner21 if the complainant can establish to the 
arbitration panel’s satisfaction that the registration or use of the domain name was in bad 
faith22 and the registrant had no legitimate purpose for registering the name.23 
 
Political cybersquatting, however, is not always covered by these laws, 
particularly if the politician’s name in question is not considered to be trademarked or 
trademarkable.24  This will certainly be true of traditional trademark infringement25 and 
dilution actions,26 and also general trademark-based anti-cybersquatting actions under the 
ACPA.27  While some additional anticybersquatting laws do deal specifically with the 
protection of individual’s names against bad faith cybersquatting even in the absence of a 
trademark interest in the name, 28 they may be limited in application.  The obvious 
example of an anti-cybersquatting law that protects non-trademarked personal names 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
19
  The range of fees for an arbitration will be around $1,000-$2,000 for a single arbitrator panel and 
a little more for a larger panel.  See InterNic FAQs on the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policy (UDRP), last viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at:  http://www.internic.net/faqs/udrp.html. 
 
20
  Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, last viewed on March 14, 2007 and 
available at:  http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm:  Rule 3(b) (complaint to be submitted in 
hard copy and electronic format); Rule 5(b) (response to be submitted in hard copy and electronic format); 
Rule 13 (no in-person hearings); Rule 16(b) (Panel decisions to be posted on panel web site). 
 
21
  UDRP, clause 4(i) (“The remedies available to a complainant pursuant to any proceeding before 
an Administrative Panel shall be limited to requiring the cancellation of your domain name or the transfer 
of your domain name registration to the complainant.”). 
 
22
  UDRP, clause 4(b). 
 
23
  UDRP, clause 4(c). 
 
24
  Generally, personal names are not registrable as trademarks:  15 U.S.C. § 1052 (c).  See also 
GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, ¶ 2.03[d].   
 
25
  15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1) (federal statutory prohibitions against trademark infringement 
for common law and registered marks respectively, premised on creation of consumer confusion as to 
source of relevant goods or services.)  
 
26
  15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (federal statutory prohibitions on trademark dilution prohibiting the 
lessening of a mark’s capacity to distinguish particular goods or services regardless of consumer 
confusion). 
 
27
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (prohibition of cybersquatting based on registration of a domain name similar 
to a trademark). 
 
28
  15 U.S.C. § 1129 (this section protects personal names against cybersquatting and is not limited to 
trademark interests in personal names). 
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against cybersquatting is § 1129 of the Lanham Act,29 introduced in 1999 as part of the 
ACPA:30 
 
Any person who registers a domain name that consists of the name 
of another living person, or a name substantially and confusingly 
similar thereto, without that person’s consent, with the specific 
intent to profit from such name by selling the domain name for 
financial gain to that person or any third party, shall be liable in a 
civil action by such person.31  
 
This will cover some political cybersquatting, although there will also be 
exceptions.  In the ‘kerryedwards.com’ scenario,32 for example, it might technically have 
been possible for the registrant, Mr Kerry Edwards, to mount several defenses to an 
ACPA challenge.  He might have argued that the domain name in question did not 
correspond to the name of another living person on the basis that ‘Kerry Edwards’ was 
not the name of either Senator Kerry or Senator Edwards, but rather an amalgam of both 
of their names.  He might also have argued that, even if the name in question did consist 
of the name of another living person, it also consisted of his own personal name – Kerry 
Edwards – and that his own right to a domain name corresponding to his personal name 
must equally be protected by §1129.   
 
With respect to the first argument, the defense might fail on the basis that § 1129 
also protects complainants against bad faith registrations of domain names that are 
‘substantially and confusingly similar’ to their own personal names.  Arguably, the 
amalgam of the names Kerry and Edwards in ‘kerryedwards.com’ in the lead up to a 
presidential election where Senators Kerry and Edwards names are those on the 
presidential ticket would be considered a registration of a name ‘substantially and 
confusingly similar’ to the Senators’ respective personal names.  The second potential 
defense argument may be more problematic, but a court taking at least an economic 
analysis of the situation may well find that the use of the name for a presidential 
campaign would be less socially and economically wasteful than the use of a name by a 
person with a corresponding personal name who is simply trying to make a profit from 
selling the name.  
 
                                                 
29
  15 U.S.C. § 1129. 
 
30
  This provision is to be distinguished from 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) which is also part of ACPA but is 
restricted to prohibitions on bad faith cybersquatting where the cybersquatter has registered a domain name 
that is similar to a trademark, as opposed to a personal name. 
 
31
  15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A). 
 
32
  See Kerry Edwards is Real and Sells Kerryedwards.Com, July 19, 2004, last viewed on March 14, 
2007 and available at:  
http://www.editorsweblog.org/news/2004/07/kerry_edwards_is_real_and_sells_kerryedw.php 
(“KerryEdwards.com is owned by a 34-year-old man named Kerry Edwards, a part-time bail bondsman in 
Indianapolis. He registered KerryEdwards.com two years ago as a personal site for family and friends.”) 
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There were two additional unusual factors about the ‘kerryedwards.com’ situation 
that may well not be repeated in many future cases.  For one thing, Mr Kerry Edwards 
happened fortuitously to have registered the domain name several years before the 
presidential campaign featuring Senators Kerry and Edwards was launched.33  Thus, in 
this particular case, had the senators brought an action against Mr Kerry Edwards, they 
may well have failed on the basis that he had not registered the domain name34 with the 
intent to profit from its sale as required by § 1129.35  The other factor, which is of course 
related to this first factor, is that Mr Kerry Edwards happened to have a personal name 
that corresponded with the two names on the presidential ticket.  This is unlikely to 
happen in many future cases.  However, it is possible that a private individual might have 
a personal name corresponding with an individual politician’s name in a future case and 
this could raise many of the difficulties that could have arisen had ‘kerryedwards.com’ 
been disputed in the lead-up to the 2004 presidential election.  How many John McCains 
are out there, for example, or Joe Bidens or Chris Dodds?  In this respect, politicians with 
unusual personal names may have big advantages over those with more common names – 
make way for Arnold Schwarzenegger and Rudy Giuliani, not to mention Barack Obama.  
It obviously does not make sense that unusual political names should fortuitously receive 
more protection than more common names in the domain space. 
 
Other than the relatively unusual situations where a private individual’s name 
may correspond with a relevant domain name, there are a few other practical problems 
with the ACPA provisions protecting personal names from bad faith registrations.  One is 
that it does not have a global reach, although at least a federal statute is better in terms of 
legal harmonization than a pastiche of often-piecemeal state laws.36  The other problem 
with § 1129 of the Lanham Act is arguably general lack of familiarity with its provisions, 
partly perhaps because they have been overshadowed by the UDRP which covers much 
of the same ground as the ACPA in a quick, inexpensive, efficient, and, of course, global 
manner.  Since the introduction of both the ACPA and the UDRP in 1999, many more 
complaints have been brought under the UDRP than the ACPA, even with respect to 
names of private individuals.37  This is not surprising, but, as recent UDRP arbitrations 
                                                 
33
  id.  
 
34
  As opposed to having used it. 
 
35
  15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) (“Any person who registers a domain name that consists of the name of 
another living person, or a name substantially and confusingly similar thereto, without that person’s 
consent, with the specific intent to profit from such name by selling the domain name for financial gain to 
that person or any third party, shall be liable in a civil action by such person.”)(emphasis added).  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(d) would not have applied here because the ‘Kerry Edwards’ name was not trademarked, nor was it 
likely trademarkable in the electoral context:  Generally, personal names are not registrable as trademarks:  
15 U.S.C. § 1052 (c).  See also GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, ¶ 2.03[d]. 
 
36
  See discussion of some relevant Californian state laws in Parts ___, infra. 
 
37
  For example, Roberts v Boyd, Case No. D2000-0210 (WIPO Arb. and Mediation Ctr., Admin. 
Panel Decision, May 29, 2000) (involving the Julia Roberts name) (last viewed on March 14, 2007 and 
available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html); Springsteen v 
Burgar, Case No D2000-1532 (WIPO Arb. and Medication Ctr., Admin. Panel Decision, Jan. 5, 2001) 
(involving Bruce Springsteen’s name) (last viewed on march 14, 2007 and available at 
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have shown, the UDRP is not as easily geared to combat cybersquatting involving any 
personal names, let alone political personal names, as § 1129 of the Lanham Act.   
 
B.  POLITICIANS’ NAMES AND THE UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION POLICY 
 
As already noted, the UDRP contains certain procedural advantages for a 
complainant concerned with an act of bad faith cybersquatting.  Its main limitation in the 
context of political cybersquatting is that it does not specifically protect personal names 
against bad faith registrations and uses.  This does not mean that no private individuals 
have attempted to utilize the UDRP to protect their interests in relevant domain names.  
In fact, some celebrities have been quite successful in this context.38  Even some 
politicians have succeeded here.39  The problem has been that, in the absence of a specific 
protection for personal names under the UDRP, complainants must successfully assert a 
trademark interest in their personal names.40  This can sometimes be done quite easily: 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html); Rita Rudner v. Internetco 
Corp., (WIPO Case No. D2000-0581, August 3, 2000) (involving Rita Rudner’s personal name) (last 
viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at:  
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0581.html); Helen Folsade Adu, known 
as Sade v. Quantum Computer Services Inc., (WIPO Case No. D2000-0794, Sep. 26, 2000) (involving 
Sade’s stage name) (last viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0794.html); Friends of Kathleen Kennedy 
Townsend v Birt (WIPO Case No D2002-0451) (involving Kathleen Kennedy Townsend’s name) (last 
viewed at March 14, 2007 and available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0451.html); Ciccone v Parisi (WIPO 
Case No D2000-0847)(involving the singer Madonna’s stage name) (last viewed on March 14, 1007 and 
available at:  http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0847.html); Hillary 
Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia a/k/a SZL.com (National Arbitration Forum Claim No. 
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005) (involving the domain name ‘hillaryclinton.com’) (last viewed on 
March 14, 2007 and available at http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm). 
 
38
  For example, Roberts v Boyd, Case No. D2000-0210 (WIPO Arb. and Mediation Ctr., Admin. 
Panel Decision, May 29, 2000) (involving the Julia Roberts name) (last viewed on March 14, 2007 and 
available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html); Ciccone v Parisi 
(WIPO Case No D2000-0847)(involving the singer Madonna’s stage name) (last viewed on March 14, 
1007 and available at:  http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0847.html). 
 
39
  Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia a/k/a SZL.com (National Arbitration Forum Claim No. 
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005) (involving the domain name ‘hillaryclinton.com’) (last viewed on 
March 14, 2007 and available at:  http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm). 
 
40
  UDRP, clause 4(a)(i) (complainant must establish trademark interests corresponding with relevant 
domain name as one of the bases for her complaint).  This was certainly played out in domain name 
disputes corresponding with the personal names of Julia Roberts, Madonna and Hillary Clinton.  UDRP 
arbitrators established that all of these people had trademark interests in their personal names to support 
their UDRP complaints.  See  Roberts v Boyd, Case No. D2000-0210 (WIPO Arb. and Mediation Ctr., 
Admin. Panel Decision, May 29, 2000) (involving the Julia Roberts name) (last viewed on March 14, 2007 
and available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html); Ciccone v 
Parisi (WIPO Case No D2000-0847)(involving the singer Madonna’s stage name) (last viewed on March 
14, 1007 and available at:  http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0847.html); 
 POLITICAL SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE 
  10 
for example, some celebrities do hold registered trademarks in their names if they use 
them as commercial trademarks.41  In other cases, UDRP arbitrators have been prepared 
to accept common law trademark rights in a famous celebrity’s42 or politician’s name.43 
 
However, in the case of even famous personal names of celebrities and 
politicians, UDRP arbitrators do not always accept a trademark interest on the part of the 
complainant.  When Bruce Springsteen and his management initiated a UDRP arbitration 
for transfer of the ‘springsteen.com’ name from a registrant utilizing it for an 
unauthorized fan website,44 the majority arbitration panelists were not convinced that 
even a celebrity as popular as Springsteen necessarily had a common law trademark right 
in his personal name.45  In the political context, Kathleen Kennedy Townsend failed to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia a/k/a SZL.com (National Arbitration Forum Claim No. 
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005) (involving the domain name ‘hillaryclinton.com’). 
 
41
  For example, the singer Madonna has registered Madonna as a trademark.  See Ciccone v Parisi 
(WIPO Case No D2000-0847)(involving the singer Madonna’s stage name) (last viewed on March 14, 
1007 and available at:  http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0847.html), ¶ 4 
(“Complainant is the well-known entertainer Madonna. She is the owner of U.S. Trademark Registrations 
for the mark MADONNA for entertainment services and related goods (Reg. No. 1,473,554 and 
1,463,601). She has used her name and mark MADONNA professionally for entertainment services since 
1979.”) 
 
42
  For example in the Julia Roberts case:  Roberts v Boyd, Case No. D2000-0210 (WIPO Arb. and 
Mediation Ctr., Admin. Panel Decision, May 29, 2000) (involving the Julia Roberts name) (last viewed on 
March 14, 2007 and available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
0210.html), ¶ 6 (“Having decided that Complainant has common law trademark rights in her name, the next 
consideration was whether the domain name <juliaroberts.com> was identical to or confusingly similar 
with Complainant’s name.”) 
 
43
  For example in the case of the ‘hillaryclinton.com’ domain name:  Hillary Rodham Clinton v 
Michele Dinoia a/k/a SZL.com (National Arbitration Forum Claim No. FA0502000414641, March 18, 
2005) (last viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (“The Panel finds that Complainant’s uncontested allegations 
establish common law rights in the HILLARY CLINTON mark sufficient to grant standing under the 
UDRP.  Complainant alleges that the HILLARY CLINTON mark has become distinctive through 
Complainant’s use and exposure of the mark in the marketplace and through use of the mark in connection 
with Complainant’s political activities, including a successful Senate campaign.”) 
 
44
  Springsteen v Burgar, Case No D2000-1532 (WIPO Arb. and Medication Ctr., Admin. Panel 
Decision, Jan. 5, 2001) (involving Bruce Springsteen’s name) (last viewed on march 14, 2007 and available 
at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html). 
 
45
  id. ¶ 6 (“It is common ground that there is no registered trade mark in the name "Bruce 
Springsteen". In most jurisdictions where trade marks are filed it would be impossible to obtain a 
registration of a name of that nature. Accordingly, Mr Springsteen must rely on common law rights to 
satisfy this element of the three part test.  It appears to be an established principle from cases such as 
Jeanette Winterson, Julia Roberts, and Sade that in the case of very well known celebrities, their names can 
acquire a distinctive secondary meaning giving rise to rights equating to unregistered trade marks, 
notwithstanding the non-registerability of the name itself. It should be noted that no evidence has been 
given of the name "Bruce Springsteen" having acquired a secondary meaning; in other words a recognition 
that the name should be associated with activities beyond the primary activities of Mr. Springsteen as a 
composer, performer and recorder of popular music.  In the view of this Panel, it is by no means clear from 
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convince UDRP arbitrators46 that she had a trademark interest in her personal name in the 
context of a gubernatorial election in Maryland.47  Interestingly, the panel suggested that 
supporters of Townsend may have been able to assert a trademark interest in her name,48 
and that Townsend herself may have successfully brought an action under § 1129 of the 
Lanham Act.49   
 
It has been suggested that the UDRP be revised to incorporate provisions 
protecting personal names from bad faith registration and use.50  However, to date, no 
revisions have been made and the World Intellectual Property Organization (‘WIPO’) has 
suggested further inquiry into the need for such revisions.51  It should be borne in mind 
that the UDRP is a global arbitration process.  The protection of personal names on a 
global scale may well raise a number of greater difficulties than adopting such provisions 
at the domestic level,52 such as in § 1129 of the Lanham Act.  On the global scale, there 
are more names and presumably more people, even potentially famous people, with 
similar or the same names.  Additionally, different legal systems may well take differing 
                                                                                                                                                 
the UDRP that it was intended to protect proper names of this nature. As it is possible to decide the case on 
other grounds, however, the Panel will proceed on the assumption that the name Bruce Springsteen is 
protected under the policy; it then follows that the domain name at issue is identical to that name.”) 
 
46
  Friends of Kathleen Kennedy Townsend v Birt (WIPO Case No D2002-0451) (involving Kathleen 
Kennedy Townsend’s name) (last viewed at March 14, 2007 and available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0451.html). 
 
47
  id, ¶6 (“The Panel finds that the protection of an individual politician's name, no matter how 
famous, is outside the scope of the Policy since it is not connected with commercial exploitation as set out 
in the Second WIPO Report.”) 
 
48
  id, ("Here, the claim for the domain names is brought by the individual politician, and not by the 
political action committee actively engaged in the raising of funds and promotion of Complainant's possible 
campaign. Had the claim been brought in the name of the Friends of Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, the 
result might well have been different. But it was not.”) 
 
49
  id, ("This does not mean that Complainant is without remedy. The ACPA contains express 
provisions protecting the rights in personal names.”)  It is not clear from the record why Townsend did not 
pursue a § 1129 action.   
 
50
  WIPO, Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process:  The Recognition of Rights and the Use of 
Names in the Internet Domain Name System, Sept 3, 2001 (last viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/processes/process2/report/html/report.html#5), ¶¶179-205. 
 
51
  id, ¶¶ 202-203 (“It is recommended that no modification be made to the UDRP to accommodate 
broader protection for personal names than that which currently exists in the UDRP ..... In making this 
recommendation, we are conscious of the strength of feeling that the unauthorized, bad faith registration 
and use of personal names as domain names engenders.  We believe, however, that the most appropriate 
way in which the strength of this feeling should be expressed is through the development of international 
norms that can provide clear guidance on the intentions and will of the international community.”) 
 
52
  See discussion of this issue in WIPO, Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process:  The 
Recognition of Rights and the Use of Names in the Internet Domain Name System, Sept 3, 2001 (last 
viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/processes/process2/report/html/report.html#5), ¶¶179-205. 
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attitudes to the protection of personal names in the domain space, whether they be 
political names, celebrity names, or private individual’s names.53     
 
C.  APPLICATION OF CYBERFRAUD LEGISLATION TO  
POLITICAL CYBERSQUATTING 
 
There are some other possible legal avenues for politicians concerned about 
political cybersquatting.  California’s Political Cyberfraud Abatement Act (‘PCAA’), 54 
for example, prohibits engaging in acts of ‘political cyberfraud’ which include conduct 
concerning a political Website:  “that is committed with the intent to deny a person 
access to a political Web site, deny a person the opportunity to register a domain name 
for a political Web site, or cause a person reasonably to believe that a political Web site 
has been posted by a person other than the person who posted the Web site…”.55  Some 
aspects of this may cover political cybersquatting, even though it is notionally directed at 
conduct described as cyberfraud.56   
 
Political cybersquatting would not likely be covered by the third statutory 
prohibition on cyberfraud - causing a person reasonably to believe that a political website 
has been posted by a person other than the person who posted the website.  This is 
because the point of cybersquatting is to sell the name for a profit rather than to make 
misleading use of the site.  It is of course possible that a domain name registrant could 
use a domain name for both purposes: that is, disseminating misleading information 
about a politician while at the same time trying to sell the domain name.  However, the 
‘misleading information’ part of such conduct is categorized throughout this article as 
‘political cyberfraud’ rather than ‘political cybersquatting’.  This is because there is a 
need to separate and categorize different types of conduct relating to political domain 
names in order to provide appropriately tailored legal solutions for relevant conduct.   
 
It is possible that political cybersquatting would be included in the first two 
prohibitions in the Californian PCAA.  It may count as conduct intended to deny a person 
access to a political website or to deny a person the opportunity to register a domain 
name for a political website.  The PCAA further defines political cybersquatting activities 
as including, but not being limited to, the following conduct: 
 
                                                 
53
  id. 
 
54
  Cal. Elec. Code, §§ 18320-23 (Deering Supp. 2005). 
 
55
  Id., § 18320(c)(1). 
 
56
  “Political cyberfraud” is defined in § 18320(c)(1) of the California Elections Code rather broadly 
as:  “a knowing and willful act concerning a political Web site that is committed with the intent to  
deny a person access to a political Web site, deny a person the opportunity to register a domain name for a 
political Web site, or cause a person reasonably to believe that a political Web site has been posted by a 
person other than the person who posted the Web site, and would cause a reasonable person, after reading 
the Web site, to believe the site actually represents the views of the proponent or opponent of a ballot 
measure …”.  
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(A) Intentionally diverting or redirecting access to a political Web site 
to another person's Web site by the use of a similar domain name ….57 
(C) Registering a domain name that is similar to another domain name 
for a political Web site.58 
(D) Intentionally preventing the use of a domain name for a political 
Web site by registering and holding the domain name or by reselling it 
to another with the intent of preventing its use, or both.59 
 
These are all examples of conduct that might deny a politician access to a relevant 
domain name, although they may not all technically amount to political cybersquatting.  
A person who engages in political cybersquatting might not necessarily be regarded as 
having ‘intentionally diverted or redirected access to a political web site to another 
website by the use of a similar domain name’.  In situations where the politician in 
question has not yet registered a relevant domain name, it would be difficult to argue that 
access was being ‘diverted’ or ‘redirected’ from the politician’s website to another 
website.  If the politician never had a website to begin with, this provision may have no 
application, although it may well apply to a situation where the politician does have a 
website, but has not registered all possible permutations of the relevant domain name.   
 
Senator Barack Obama, for example, has registered ‘barackobama.com’, but at 
the time of writing does not appear to have registered ‘barack.com’ or ‘obama.com’.  If 
someone else registered either of these names, as indeed currently appears to be the case 
with ‘barack.com’, Senator Obama may be able to bring a successful complaint under the 
PCAA60 on the basis that the name diverts web users from his own website.  Presumably, 
he would have to prove this to be the case in practice.  It is not clear what would be 
necessary in this context: for example, would he simply have to prove that consumers 
were initially confused by typing the wrong domain name into their web browser and 
ending up at the wrong website, even if they were not thereafter prevented from finding 
his site through use of their browsers or search engines?61 
                                                 
57
  id, § 18320(c)(1)(A). 
 
58
  id, § 18320(c)(1)(C). 
 
59
  id, § 18320(c)(1)(D). 
 
60
  id, § 18320(c)(1)(A). 
 
61
  This would be similar to the ‘initial interest confusion’ doctrine that has arisen in the commercial 
trademark context with respect to a domain name registrant effectively confusing a ‘search engine’ rather 
than an Internet user as to the relationship between a domain name and a trademark.  Even though Internet 
users would not necessarily be confused once they arrived at the site they were not actually searching for, 
courts have been prepared to find the ‘consumer confusion’ requirement of trademark infringement law 
made out on the basis of the notion of ‘initial interest confusion’.  See, for example, Brookfield 
Communications Inc v West Coast Entertainment Corp, 174 F 3d 1036, 1054-1064 (9th Cir 19999); Eric 
Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 507, 559 
(‘[Initial interest confusion] lacks a rigorous definition, a clear policy justification, and a uniform standard 
for analyzing claims.  With its doctrinal flexibility, [it] has become the tool of choice for plaintiffs to shut 
down junior users who have not actually engaged in misappropriative uses.”; Panavision Int’l v Toeppen, 
141 F 3d 1316 (9th Cir., 1998) (consumers would not actually have been confused as to source by 
defendant’s website, but may have been distracted from finding the plaintiff’s actual web presence).  
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Similar comments may be made about sub-section (C) supra.  ‘Registering a 
domain name that is similar to another domain name for a political website’ may not 
include situations where the politician in question has not yet registered a domain name 
corresponding with her personal name.  However, where the politician in question 
already does have a web presence, this sub-provision may be more useful than sub-
section (A) because it does not require the complainant to establish an intent to divert or 
redirect access to the website.  It only requires registration of a name that is similar to an 
existing political domain name. 
 
Sub-section (D) looks to be much more directed at the kind of conduct described 
in this article as ‘political cybersquatting’ than the other provisions.  It prohibits 
‘intentionally preventing the use of a domain name for a political website by registering 
and holding the domain name or by reselling it to another with the intent of preventing its 
use, or both.’  This does not appear to require the politician in question to have already 
registered any domain name.  It would cover a situation where a politician was prevented 
from registering a name she wanted as a domain name by a registrant who either holds on 
to the name and does not resell it, or by a registrant who sells the name with the intent to 
prevent its use by the politician.   
 
However, the drafting of this provision may still be somewhat problematic in the 
situations described here as ‘political cybersquatting’.  For one thing, the provision does 
not cover situations where the registrant of the domain name is prepared to sell the 
domain name to the politician for a profit.  It only appears to cover situations where the 
registrant is attempting to prevent a politician from using the name.  Thus, it would cover 
the situation where the registrant of ‘barack.com’ either wasted an important political 
resource by simply holding it and not using it, or where the registrant attempted to sell it 
to someone else who might prevent its use by Senator Obama.  It does not seem to 
contemplate a situation where the registrant specifically attempts to sell the name to 
Senator Obama for a profit. 
 
There are also jurisdictional problems with the application of the PCAA.  
Currently, California is the only state with such legislation.  It is not clear whether this 
legislation would apply in situations where neither the politician in question nor the 
domain name registrant is located in California.  It is possible that the ability of web users 
to access the website in California would be a sufficient connection with California for 
the Californian law to apply.62  Additionally, it is possible that if the domain name was 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
62
  Although some case law suggests that the mere ability to access a website within a jurisdiction, 
without more, is insufficient basis at least for the assertion of personal jurisdiction against a defendant 
website operator.  See, for example, Bensusan Restaurant Corp v King, 937 F Supp 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), 
aff’d 126 F 3d 25 (2d Cir 1997) (the defendants who operated a jazz club in Missouri could not be subject 
to personal jurisdiction in New York by the owners of a jazz club with the same name in New York City in 
the absence of conduct greater than advertising their Missouri club on their website that was accessible in 
New York City, although not specifically directed to New York City residents). 
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registered in California, this would be sufficient grounds for Californian law to apply.63  
However, if this was the case, clever domain name cybersquatters would simply select a 
domain name registrar not situated in California.64 
 
Maybe if political cybersquatting is regarded as a sufficiently important activity 
for regulation at the federal or global level, certain ideas could be taken from the 
Californian legislation and incorporated into either a federal statute or global treaty.  
Alternately, at the global level, some of these ideas could be incorporated into a dispute 
resolution procedure such as the UDRP.  Domain name registrants could contractually 
agree with registrars that they would submit to an arbitration procedure not unlike the 
UDRP if a politician, or perhaps political party,65 later complained about registration of 
the relevant name, particularly in the context of an election.  The bad faith factors in such 
a dispute procedure could be borrowed to some extent from the Californian PCAA, 
although they should perhaps be a little broader in order to cover situations where the 
politician in question has not yet registered any domain names.  They should also cover 
situations where the registrant attempts to sell the domain name to either the politician or 
a third party.  This approach may be quicker, cheaper and more efficient than federal 
legislation or an international treaty, particularly a treaty requiring implementing 
legislation.   
 
D.  POLITICAL CYBERSQUATTING, DEFAMATION LAW  
AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
 
1.  DEFAMATION 
 
Another group of laws that may apply to political cybersquatting conduct, albeit 
somewhat indirectly, are various tort laws that protect individual reputations from 
harmful conduct.  These include defamation law, the right of publicity,66 and some sui 
                                                 
63
  The ACPA, for example, is a domain name law that includes in rem jurisdiction provisions in the 
case of domain names registered in a particular jurisdiction where the plaintiff is not otherwise able 
effectively to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant domain name registrant:  15 U.S.C. § 
1125(d)(2)(A). 
 
64
  For example, a list of ICANN-accredited domain name registries from all over the world is 
available at:  http://www.icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html (last viewed on March 14, 2007). 
 
65
  Political parties may, in fact, be in a better position than politicians under the UDRP as currently 
drafted.  See Friends of Kathleen Kennedy Townsend v Birt (WIPO Case No D2002-0451) (involving 
Kathleen Kennedy Townsend’s name) (last viewed at March 14, 2007 and available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0451.html), ¶6 ("Here, the claim for the 
domain names is brought by the individual politician, and not by the political action committee actively 
engaged in the raising of funds and promotion of Complainant's possible campaign. Had the claim been 
brought in the name of the Friends of Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, the result might well have been 
different. But it was not.”)  
 
66
  Michael Madow, Personality as Property:  The Uneasy Case for Publicity Rights in PETER YU 
(ed), INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH:  ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE, 
VOLUME 3, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, 345, 3451 (2007) (The right to publicity “gives a 
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generis state legislation such as California’s Business and Professions Code.67  The most 
obvious tort that deals with a person’s reputation is defamation.  Defamation generally 
refers to false statements which damage an individual’s reputation.68  It may, in fact, be a 
state or federal wrong, depending on the context.69  Although defamation may be relevant 
to variations of the conduct described in this article as ‘political cyberfraud’ – see infra – 
it likely has little to no application to political cybersquatting.  This is because 
cybersquatting does not deal with any statements that might damage an individual 
politician’s reputation.  Rather, it removes from the politician’s ready accessibility a 
domain name that the politician might use to make statements in support of her 
campaign.  Thus, defamation need not be discussed further with respect to political 
cybersquatting. 
 
2.  THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
 
The state right of publicity, on the other hand, could possibly have some 
application to political cybersquatting.  The right of publicity has been described as:  “the 
right of an individual to control the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, 
signature, or other personal characteristics.”70  It has further been likened to a trademark-
like right in a famous person’s attributes in the sense that it protects the goodwill inherent 
in that person’s commercial persona.71  The right of publicity operates much like a 
trademark in the sense that it:  “reserves to an individual celebrity the exclusive right to 
the commercial exploitation of his or her name, likeness, signature, or product 
endorsement.”72 
 
To determine whether the right of publicity might have any application in the 
political cybersquatting context, two fundamental questions have to be answered.  The 
first is whether the registration of a domain name corresponding with a politician’s name 
                                                                                                                                                 
celebrity a legal entitlement to the commercial value of her identity, and thereby enables her to determine 
the extent, manner, and timing of its commercial exploitation.”) 
 
67
  See § 17525(a), discussed in more detail in Part ___ infra. 
 
68
  JANET L SILVERBERG, BUSINESS TORTS, 1-6, ¶ 6.01. 
 
69
  id, 1-6, ¶ 6.01 (Defamation issues have arisen in federal constitutional law since the United States 
Supreme Court landmark decision in New York Times v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). 
 
70
  GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, 1-2, § 2.16[1]. 
 
71
  Id. (“The right of publicity is analogous to the right in a trademark.  Both are exclusionary in 
nature, giving rise to injunctive relief and possible damages when they are violated, and both depend for 
their value to a great degree on public recognition, perception, and association.  The goodwill which a 
trademark symbolizes is first cousin to the goodwill, or reputation and fame, of the celebrity.  These 
establish the commercial value of the right to be protected, a value which in either case can be enormous.  
They significantly enhance the sales potential of the trademark or celebrity-endorsed products with which 
they are associated, and can create a formidable competitive advantage.”) 
 
72
  Id. § 2.15[1][b]. 
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for the purposes of commercial profit amounts to a ‘commercial exploitation’73 of the 
celebrity’s name in the manner contemplated by the law.  The second is whether 
politicians are protected by the right of publicity in the context of purely political 
campaigns, as distinct from other more commercial activities.  Neither question has been 
definitely answered by any state or federal courts or legislatures in the United States.  
Additionally, the right of publicity is not accepted in all American states,74 let alone 
globally, so that is an additional limitation. 
 
It is not clear whether the commercial sale or attempted sale of a domain name 
that corresponds to a politician’s name is the kind of conduct generally contemplated 
within the right of publicity.  Usually, the actions brought under this tort are concerned 
with the sale of specific items – photographs, tee-shirts, magazines, toys, etc – that 
contain, or are based on, an unauthorized likeness of a famous celebrity.75  On the one 
hand, the sale of a domain name that corresponds to a famous celebrity’s name may well 
be likened to the sale of a product that contains or constitutes the name or likeness of the 
person in question.  On the other hand, could the sale of an unauthorized photograph, tee-
shirt, or coffee mug bearing the name or likeness of, say, Britney Spears, really be 
likened to the sale of a blank web page with the domain name ‘britney.com’, or even 
‘britneyspears.com’?  In the case of the physical goods, it would seem more plausible that 
consumers would be confused as to whether or not the pop singer, Britney Spears, had 
authorized the product line, than in the case of a blank web-page utilizing a domain name 
that corresponds with her name.  This is because the goods in question might constitute a 
line of products that collectors may want to purchase, whereas a blank webpage – or a 
webpage that is obviously for sale to the highest bidder - is unlikely to attract consumers 
in this way. 
 
Even if the domain name is regarded as a ‘product’ that is being ‘sold’ in the 
political cybersquatting context, it is not the kind of product sale generally contemplated 
                                                 
73
  Id. 
 
74
  GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, § 2.16[1] (“The publicity right is still 
developing and the courts are far from unanimous in defining its scope.  Precedent (or the lack of it) in the 
selected forum may thus dictate reliance on trademark rights and unfair competition claims to the exclusion 
of, or in addition to, the publicity right.  In either case the celebrity may rely on his or her federal 
registration, Section 43(a), common law unfair competition, and the same assortment of state statutes that 
are available in infringement actions involving other types of marks.”) 
 
75
  Winterland Concessions Co v Creative Screen Design Ltd, 210 U.S.P.Q. 6 (N.D. Ill 1980) (dealing 
with rock star names on tee shirts); Allen v Men’s World Outlet Inc, 679 F Supp 360, U.S.P.Q. 2d 1850 (use 
of Woddy Allen look alike for clothing store advertisements); Hoffman v Capital Cities/ABC Inc, 255 F 3d 
1180, 59 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1363 (9th Cir, 2001) (use of digitally manipulated image of Dustin Hoffman in 
magazine).  In this context, celebrity names will often attain a common law trademark status as well:  
GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, 1-2, § 2.16[1] (“[A] celebrity’s name or likeness may 
itself be a trademark, if it is used by the celebrity to identify the source of products or services and to 
distinguish them from those of others.  GLORIA VANDERBILT jeans, JIMMY DEAN sausage, REGGIE 
candy bars, are but a few examples of celebrity-trademarked products.  If the celebrity uses the name or 
likeness in this way, he or she can ordinarily obtain federal registration, so the name or likeness will enjoy 
the benefits provided by the [Lanham Act]”.) 
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by the right of publicity.  It is not really a sale to consumers of an unauthorized celebrity 
likeness.  Rather, it is potentially a sale of a product to an individual who might utilize is 
it many ways – as an unauthorized fan site in the case of a celebrity or as a site to 
disseminate information about a politician in the political context.  In other words, 
perhaps political cybersquatting is more like selling the means through which someone 
may engage in conduct that may or may not be sanctioned by various laws – including 
political cyberfraud laws.76  It may thus result in some form of contributory infringement 
for some other kind of tort but may not in and of itself amount to conduct that would 
ordinarily be proscribed by the right of publicity. 
 
Even if this analysis is not correct, there is still an open question as to whether the 
right of publicity protects politicians, as opposed to celebrities whose notoriety is based 
on commercial, rather than political, aspects of their persona.77  This question was 
recently cast into the limelight in a case involving Arnold Schwarzenegger, as governor 
of California, filing a lawsuit against a manufacturer of bobblehead dolls bearing his 
name and likeness.78  Although the case was settled, it raised many issues as to the 
application of the right of publicity to politicians, as opposed to people whose celebrity is 
derived from other means. 
 
The issue was particularly confusing in the Governor Schwarzenegger situation 
because he had attained fame and celebrity through sports, film, and political careers.  
Had the matter been judicially decided, the court may have had to decide specifically 
whether the defendant’s dolls were commenting on the Governor’s political persona – in 
which case they may have been protected by the First Amendment – or could be seen as 
purely usurping the Governor’s commercial interests in his persona and likeness.79 
                                                 
76
  See Part ___,  infra. 
 
77
  See, for example, Martin Luther King, Jr Center for Social Change, Inc v American Heritage 
Products, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981), rev’d per curiam, 694 F. 2d. 674 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(holding that the right of publicity extends to ‘public figures who are not public officials’ in the sense of 
holding public office); New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority, 987 F. Supp. 254 (1997) 
(holding that then-Mayor Rudolph Guiliani could not succeed in a right of publicity with respect to 
advertisements for the New York times that depicted him in a less than complimentary light, and that an 
attempt to prevent display of the advertisements on public buses in New York City was an infringement of 
the New York Times’ First Amendment rights); New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority, 
987 F. Supp. 254, 269 (1997) (“Though the ad as a whole is commercial speech, the advertisement 
undeniably includes an element of political commentary.  It would be anomalous indeed to permit a reprint 
of a caricature of Guiliani that had appeared in the magazine, but prohibit the Ad at issue which includes 
speech of public interest.” 
 
78
  See discussion in Tyler Ochoa, The Schwarzenegger Bobblehead Case:  Introduction and 
Statement of Facts, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 547 (2005). 
 
79
  Charles Harder and Henry Self III Schwarzenegger vs Bobbleheads:  The Case for 
Schwarzenneger, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 547, 557 (2005) (noting that there is a public affairs exception to 
the right of publicity in California, but that it would not likely apply to the Schwarzenegger bobblehead 
dolls because they contained no discernable political slogans or messages, but were merely a depiction or 
imitation of Schwarzenegger in the form of a doll); William Gallagher, Strategic Intellectual Property 
Litigation, the Right of Publicity, and the Attenuation of Free Speech:  Lessons from the Schwarzenegger 
Bobblehead Doll War (and Peace), 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 581, 597-598 (2005) (“[T]he Schwarzenegger 
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In the course of debates over the Schwarzenegger bobblehead dolls, 
commentators noted how few right of publicity actions had been brought by sitting 
politicians in the past.80  Various suggestions were raised as to why this might be the 
case.  They included: (a) politicians are often not generally concerned with commercial 
use of their image ‘because it is not their typical business’;81 (b) politicians do not wish to 
invest resources into such claims;82 (c) politicians want to avoid negative publicity that 
may arise from such claims83 partly because they do not want to appear ‘humorles or 
soft-skinned’;84 and, (d) politicians are aware that the sale of products bearing their name 
or likeness might be protected by the First Amendment.85 
 
A number of arguments may be raised in favor of extending the right of publicity 
to politicians and other public figures who are not celebrities in the sports and 
                                                                                                                                                 
likeness was not being used to sell other products but was the product itself, albeit in a creative expression 
of that image.  The Schwarzenegger image was thus part of the “raw materials” or the medium that the 
bobblehead doll’s creators used to convey the multivocal messages the doll communicated.  This message 
invariably comments, at least in part, on the Schwarzenegger political image and persona even if it also 
simultaneously comments on the Schwarzenegger Hollywood movie star persona.  The governor himself, 
after all, has certainly made effective use of his Hollwyood tough-guy, “Terminator” image in political life.   
Schwarzenegger, now the governor, has become the “Governator,” a play on words that evokes the dual 
personas of the current Schwarzenegger image.  This image is also used extensively in political cartoons 
commenting on Schwarzenegger’s new status as a politician.  It would be disturbing for a court to hold that 
the right of publicity should trump the … defendants’ right to sell a doll that similarly comments on the 
Schwarzenegger image.  Such a decision would also be incongruous because it would permit 
Schwarzenegger to monopolize his image as the “Governator” for both political and private profit.”) 
 
80
  William Gallagher, Strategic Intellectual Property Litigation, the Right of Publicity, and the 
Attenuation of Free Speech:  Lessons from the Schwarzenegger Bobblehead Doll War (and Peace), 45 
SANTA CLARA L REV 581, 597-598 (2005) ([I]t was virtually unprecedented for a sitting politician to sue in 
order to control the use of his or her image in similar circumstances [to the Schwarzenegger litigation].  
The … defendants sold an entire series of bobbleheads depicting both living and deceased politicians; yet 
they had never previously been subject to legal threats of proceedings to prevent the sales of these dolls.  In 
fact, as many news reports gleefully explained the [defendants] had previously sent copies of dolls to 
several politicians who apparently appreciated (or, perhaps, acquiesced to) having their likeness made into 
a bobblehead doll.”); Charles Harder and Henry Self III Schwarzenegger vs Bobbleheads:  The Case for 
Schwarzenneger, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 547, 567 (2005) (“Few courts have had an opportunity to rule on 
an unauthorized commercial use of a political figure’s name or likeness.  Politicians typically do not pursue 
such claims …”) 
 
81
  Charles Harder and Henry Self III Schwarzenegger vs Bobbleheads:  The Case for 
Schwarzenneger, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 547, 567-8 (2005). 
 
82
  id., 568. 
 
83
  id. 
 
84
  William Gallagher, Strategic Intellectual Property Litigation, the Right of Publicity, and the 
Attenuation of Free Speech:  Lessons from the Schwarzenegger Bobblehead Doll War (and Peace), 45 
SANTA CLARA L REV 581, 583 (2005). 
 
85
  id. 
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entertainment context.  Surprisingly, there are very few obvious arguments as to why 
politicians should not enjoy a right of publicity in jurisdictions where the action is 
available.  First Amendment concerns can be dealt with as a question of fact in an 
individual case – as suggested in comments on the Schwarzenegger bobblehead 
litigation.86  Additionally, many politicians have been, and will likely continue to be, 
deterred from bringing right of publicity actions because of concerns about public 
perception and perhaps also lack of success on First Amendment grounds. 
 
The arguments in favor of extending the right of publicity to politicians include 
the fact that in cases of pure commercial use of a politician’s name or likeness, there 
seems to be no good policy reason for differentiating between politicians and other public 
figures, like sports and entertainment stars.87  Assuming that First Amendment concerns 
                                                 
86
  Charles Harder and Henry Self III Schwarzenegger vs Bobbleheads:  The Case for 
Schwarzenneger, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 547, 557 (2005) (noting that there is a public affairs exception to 
the right of publicity in California, but that it would not likely apply to the Schwarzenegger bobblehead 
dolls because they contained no discernable political slogans or messages, but were merely a depiction or 
imitation of Schwarzenegger in the form of a doll); William Gallagher, Strategic Intellectual Property 
Litigation, the Right of Publicity, and the Attenuation of Free Speech:  Lessons from the Schwarzenegger 
Bobblehead Doll War (and Peace), 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 581, 597-598 (2005) (“[T]he Schwarzenegger 
likeness was not being used to sell other products but was the product itself, albeit in a creative expression 
of that image.  The Schwarzenegger image was thus part of the “raw materials” or the medium that the 
bobblehead doll’s creators used to convey the multivocal messages the doll communicated.  This message 
invariably comments, at least in part, on the Schwarzenegger political image and persona even if it also 
simultaneously comments on the Schwarzenegger Hollywood movie star persona.  The governor himself, 
after all, has certainly made effective use of his Hollwyood tough-guy, “Terminator” image in political life.   
Schwarzenegger, now the governor, has become the “Governator,” a play on words that evokes the dual 
personas of the current Schwarzenegger image.  This image is also used extensively in political cartoons 
commenting on Schwarzenegger’s new status as a politician.  It would be disturbing for a court to hold that 
the right of publicity should trump the … defendants’ right to sell a doll that similarly comments on the 
Schwarzenegger image.  Such a decision would also be incongruous because it would permit 
Schwarzenegger to monopolize his image as the “Governator” for both political and private profit.”)  Even 
prior to the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll controversy, suggestions had been made that it would not be 
an impossible task to differentiate free speech concerns from purely commercial concerns in many right of 
publicity cases involving political figures:  Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures:  
Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 
1161, 1174 (1985) (“Where no legitimate first amendment purpose is served by the product, the 
manufacturer or advertiser should be required to pay for the privilege of using the political figure’s name or 
face to sell it.  As an example, even though commemorative items may deserve protection in some 
instances, it is hard to image [sic] that such items as “plastic toy pencil sharpeners, soap products, target 
games, candy dispensers and beverage stirring rods” are a form of expression.  An advertiser should not be 
able to hide behind the first amendment simply because he has chosen to exploit a political figure.”) 
 
87
  Charles Harder and Henry Self III Schwarzenegger vs Bobbleheads:  The Case for 
Schwarzenneger, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 547, 565 (2005) (“The notion that political figures have no right 
to control the commercial use of their names and images contradicts both the letter and purpose of right of 
publicity laws.  If the law did not apply to political figures, companies could freely exploit politicians’ 
names and images in advertising for their products, or on the products themselves, with impunity.  George 
W. Bush toothbrushes and Dick Cheney laundry detergent, for example, could pervade our supermarkets 
and households.”)  
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can effectively be dealt with on a case-by-case basis,88 there seems to be no good policy 
reason why politicians who have spent time and effort developing their images should not 
be protected from unauthorized commercial, as opposed to political, exploitations of 
those images.89  This would appear to be the case whatever the theoretical basis for the 
right of publicity – which is still a matter of some controversy even in traditional 
celebrity-focused right of publicity cases.90   
 
If the right of publicity is regarded as being theoretically based on Lockean 
notions of property,91 there are good arguments that political figures are just as deserving 
                                                 
88
  Charles Harder and Henry Self III Schwarzenegger vs Bobbleheads:  The Case for 
Schwarzenneger, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 547, 557 (2005) (noting that there is a public affairs exception to 
the right of publicity in California, but that it would not likely apply to the Schwarzenegger bobblehead 
dolls because they contained no discernable political slogans or messages, but were merely a depiction or 
imitation of Schwarzenegger in the form of a doll); William Gallagher, Strategic Intellectual Property 
Litigation, the Right of Publicity, and the Attenuation of Free Speech:  Lessons from the Schwarzenegger 
Bobblehead Doll War (and Peace), 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 581, 597-598 (2005) (“[T]he Schwarzenegger 
likeness was not being used to sell other products but was the product itself, albeit in a creative expression 
of that image.  The Schwarzenegger image was thus part of the “raw materials” or the medium that the 
bobblehead doll’s creators used to convey the multivocal messages the doll communicated.  This message 
invariably comments, at least in part, on the Schwarzenegger political image and persona even if it also 
simultaneously comments on the Schwarzenegger Hollywood movie star persona.  The governor himself, 
after all, has certainly made effective use of his Hollwyood tough-guy, “Terminator” image in political life.   
Schwarzenegger, now the governor, has become the “Governator,” a play on words that evokes the dual 
personas of the current Schwarzenegger image.  This image is also used extensively in political cartoons 
commenting on Schwarzenegger’s new status as a politician.  It would be disturbing for a court to hold that 
the right of publicity should trump the … defendants’ right to sell a doll that similarly comments on the 
Schwarzenegger image.  Such a decision would also be incongruous because it would permit 
Schwarzenegger to monopolize his image as the “Governator” for both political and private profit.”)  Even 
prior to the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll controversy, suggestions had been made that it would not be 
an impossible task to differentiate free speech concerns from purely commercial concerns in many right of 
publicity cases involving political figures:  Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures:  
Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 
1161, 1174 (1985) (“Where no legitimate first amendment purpose is served by the product, the 
manufacturer or advertiser should be required to pay for the privilege of using the political figure’s name or 
face to sell it.  As an example, even though commemorative items may deserve protection in some 
instances, it is hard to image [sic] that such items as “plastic toy pencil sharpeners, soap products, target 
games, candy dispensers and beverage stirring rods” are a form of expression.  An advertiser should not be 
able to hide behind the first amendment simply because he has chosen to exploit a political figure.”). 
 
89
  Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures:  Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for 
Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1170 (1985) (“Political figures 
have usually invested much time, money, and effort in building up a public image, just as entertainers have.  
Few people are simply thrust into the political arena.  By their own labors, in a very competitive field, 
political figures have created publicity value in their names and faces.”) 
 
90
  For a summary of the various theoretical arguments posited to support the right of publicity, see 
Michael Madow, Personality as Property:  The Uneasy Case for Publicity Rights in PETER YU (ed), 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH:  ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE, 
VOLUME 3, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, 345, 353-361 (2007) (describing moral, economic, 
and consumer protection-focused theories underlying the right of publicity). 
 
91
  JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1690), Chapter V (Locke’s theory 
of property); Uhlaender v Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970) (“It is this court’s view 
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of reaping the rewards of their labors in developing their public personas as celebrities.92  
If the right is based on an associated tort-based concept of unjust enrichment,93 there is 
equally no reason why a person who has not shared in investing in the market value of a 
politician’s image should be entitled to reap the economic rewards of the politician’s 
efforts:  “No social purpose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the 
plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would normally pay.”94  Even if 
the right of publicity is regarded as being based in theories of personal privacy, it clearly 
protects some economic benefits.95  Certainly, political cybersquatters are contemplating 
economic benefits when registering domain names corresponding with politicians’ 
names. 
 
Another reason why the right of publicity should be extended to politicians is that 
failure to do so might result in politicians being unable to make a living after devoting an 
often-significant part of their lives, resources, and interests to public service.  Many 
politicians will not try to make money from their names while they are in office,96 
                                                                                                                                                 
that a celebrity has a legitimate proprietary interest in his public personality.  A celebrity must be 
considered to have invested his years of practice and competition in a public personality which eventually 
may reach marketable status.  That identity, embodied in his name, likeness … and other personal 
characteristics, is the fruit of his labors and is a type of property.”)  For a critique of the application of this 
theory in the right of publicity context, see Michael Madow, Personality as Property:  The Uneasy Case for 
Publicity Rights in PETER YU (ed), INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH:  ISSUES AND 
PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE, VOLUME 3, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, 345, 354-355 (2007). 
 
92
  Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures:  Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for 
Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1170 (1985) (“Political figures 
have usually invested much time, money, and effort in building up a public image, just as entertainers have.  
Few people are simply thrust into the political arena.  By their own labors, in a very competitive field, 
political figures have created publicity value in their names and faces.”) 
 
93
  Michael Madow, Personality as Property:  The Uneasy Case for Publicity Rights in PETER YU 
(ed), INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH:  ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE, 
VOLUME 3, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, 345, 355-356 (2007) (describing the case for and 
against an unjust-enrichment model for the right of publicity). 
 
94
  Zacchini v Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co, 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (quoting Kalven, Privacy 
in Tort Law – Were Warren & Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP PROBLS 325, 331 (1966)). 
 
95
  GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, § 2.16[5] (on the distinction between 
personal and property theories underlying the right of publicity and the relationship of personal remedies to 
proprietary remedies); Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures:  Martin Luther King, Jr., 
Center for Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1164-1166 (1985) 
(describing the derivation of a Lockean property right in this context from a privacy intrusion tort).  See 
also Michael Madow, Personality as Property:  The Uneasy Case for Publicity Rights in PETER YU (ed), 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH:  ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE, 
VOLUME 3, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, 345, 360-361 (2007) (describing personal autonomy 
theories that might explain the right of publicity in terms of personal freedom, rather than personal 
property); Mark McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U PITT L REV 225 
(2005). 
 
96
  Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures:  Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for 
Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1171 (1985) (“Most public 
servants are not trying to make money from their names while they are in office.”) 
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although some may try to make money from their names and positions to fund a 
campaign for office.97  Assuming that most politicians will not make a commercial profit 
from their personas during the majority of their political lifetime, should they be 
potentially robbed of the commercial benefits of their names and images after they leave 
office?98   
 
In the electoral context, political cybersquatting activities may chill political 
speech in the lead-up to an election which is clearly an undesirable and wasteful social 
outcome.  It is difficult to imagine that political cybersquatting could result in more or 
more useful political discourse pertaining to a politician in the lead-up to an election.  
Thus, political discourse is ultimately made more expensive by this conduct.  In the 
absence of the cybersquatting conduct, the use of the name in the political context would 
be much less expensive than if a cybersquatter needs to be paid off to secure the use of 
the name in the electoral context.  Thus, the cybersquatter’s socially wasteful commercial 
interests could chill protected First Amendment speech in the absence of some remedy at 
least for the politician.99  It may be that the right of publicity is a plausible legal 
possibility to address such conduct.  If indeed there is no reason not to extend the right to 
politicians, at least in contexts where the defendant’s use of a politician’s name or 
likeness is for purely commercial purposes, then there should be no objection to 
developing the right of publicity in this context.   
 
There may be some question as to whether the right of publicity provides 
appropriate remedies for political cybersquatting.  Generally in a traditional right of 
publicity case, a plaintiff will want an injunction100 to prevent the sale of the products in 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
97
  For example, Senator Hillary Clinton has obviously used her ‘celebrity’ in publishing several 
books that may not otherwise have been published, and this money can be used to fund a presidential 
campaign.  The authorship of these books was noted in the ‘hillaryclinton.com’ domain name dispute as the 
basis for common law trademark rights in Senator Clinton’s name: Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele 
Dinoia, Claim Number FA050200041461, March 18, 2005. 
 
98
  Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures:  Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for 
Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1171 (1985) (“[Public servants’ 
may … wish to market themselves for profit after they leave office.  The decision to enter the political 
arena should not forever foreclose a person from realizing the financial benefits of fame.  If a political 
figure has no control over the commercial use of his name and face until he retires, he may not ever be able 
to realize any financial benefits from it.  For a political figure to exercise the right himself while in office 
would not likely be viewed favorably by the public and, if he cannot prevent others from exploiting his 
fame, he will have little ability to market himself when he retires.”) 
 
99
  It is also possible that if the politician does not want to use the domain name, the interests of 
cybersquatters should be secondary to interests in the name by other people who want to use the name for 
actual political discourse in the context of the election as opposed to commercial profit.  However, in this 
article it is contemplated that politicians will generally want to hold registrations of domain names that 
most closely resemble their own names in the electoral context. 
 
100
  GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, § 2.16[6] (“Upon proof of violation of the 
right of publicity the courts almost always grant injunctive relief.  Since the primary purpose of the right of 
publicity is to prevent the unauthorized use of a person’s name and likeness, an injunction may be perfectly 
tailored to prevent further violation.” 
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question as well as perhaps an account of profits101 or some other kind of monetary 
damages.102  In the political cybersquatting case, the politician in question will more than 
likely want transfer of the name to her, rather than an injunction or monetary 
compensation.  Thus, the remedies for actions in the right of publicity are not as good a 
fit for political cybersquatting as, say, the UDRP remedy of transfer of the name from a 
bad faith registrant to a person with a legitimate interest in the name.  Because the UDRP 
is cheap, efficient, and global in its scope, and because its remedies are of the kind most 
suited to political cybersquatting, it may be more sensible at least in the short term to 
extend the UDRP to political cybersquatting than to rely on the right to publicity.   
 
In summary, it is simply not clear whether, or to what extent, the right of publicity 
might help to potential politician-plaintiffs in a cybersquatting action, at least as currently 
framed.  This may be a useful avenue of development for future law and policy, but at the 
moment it contains many uncertainties, including: (a) lack of domestic and international 
harmonization as to the contours of the right of publicity; (b) uncertainty as to the scope 
of the right in the context of domain names reflecting a politicians’ names; and, (c) 
questions as to whether the kind of remedies tailored for the right of publicity are really 
what a plaintiff will want in a political cybersquatting case.  Similar problems may well 
arise in relation to other sui generis state law initiatives that might protect politicians 
against political cybersquatters.  An obvious example may be found in recently-
developed provisions of California’s Business and Professions Code.  
 
3.  CALIFORNIA’S BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE 
 
California’s Business and Professions Code was revised soon after the enactment 
of the ACPA at the federal level in order to deal with certain kinds of cybersquatting 
activities.  In August of 2000, the Californian legislature enacted several new sections of 
the Code to counter these kinds of activities – with a somewhat broader scope than the 
federal legislation.103  The new § 17525(a) of the Code provides that: 
 
It is unlawful for a person, with a bad faith intent to 
register, traffic in, or use a domain name, that is identical or 
confusingly similar to the personal name of another living 
person or deceased personality, without regard to the goods 
or services of the parties.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
101
  id, (“The more common measure of damages in right of publicity cases is the commercial or fair 
market value of the endorsement.  Other losses may also be included, such as a decrease in the 
manufacturer’s sales of a competing product properly endorsed by the celebrity, and an account for profits 
may be awarded.”) 
 
102
  id., (noting that outside the ‘account of profits’ area of damages, general damages may be awarded 
for ‘hurt feelings’ and that punitive damages may occasionally be awarded where the common law element 
of malicious intent can be established). 
 
103
  15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d), 1129. 
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This prohibition is broader than the personal name provisions of the ACPA104 in 
several respects.  The first is that it extends protection to a deceased personality as well as 
to a living person.  The second, and more relevant for the purposes of this article, is that 
the Californian legislation sets out a list of bad faith factors that are somewhat broader 
than those in the federal legislation.105  In particular, § 17526(j) of the Californian 
legislation includes as a bad faith factor:  “The intent of a person alleged to be in 
violation of this article to mislead, deceive, or defraud voters.”   
 
At first glance, this legislation appears to have some application to political 
cybersquatting in the sense that the registrant in question has registered a domain name 
that corresponds with the name of a living person without regard to the goods or services 
of the parties.  The real question here would be whether the registrant had an intent to 
‘mislead, deceive, or defraud voters’.  A political cybersquatter who is not using the 
domain name to promulgate any message about the relevant politician, other than that the 
domain name is available for sale, probably has not engaged in such conduct.  Unlike a 
person engaging in political cyberfraud,106 a political cybersquatter is trying to make a 
profit from the registration of the name without actually disseminating any particular 
message to voters. 
 
It is possible that a political cybersquatter might be found to have infringed § 
17525(a) regardless of a failure to satisfy the bad faith test in § 17526(j) on a variety of 
other grounds.  It is important to recognize that the bad faith factors in § 17526 are not 
intended to be exclusive.107  Additionally, some of the other bad faith factors in § 17526 
may apply to political cybersquatting although not, perhaps, as obviously at first glance 
as § 17526(j) because they do not focus specifically on the political context.  They 
include: 
 
“(e) The intent of a person alleged to be in violation of this  
article to divert consumers from the person's … online location to a 
site accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill 
represented by the person's … name either for commercial gain or 
with the intent to tarnish or disparage the person's … name by 
creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, 
                                                 
104
  15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A). 
 
105
  The federal legislation’s ‘bad faith’ factors technically do not apply specifically to 15 U.S.C. § 
1129(1)(A), as they are in the provision dealing with cybersquatting relating to trademarks (as opposed to 
personal names) – 15 U.S.C. §1125(d)(1)(B)(i).  However, those factors may well guide courts in 
interpreting §1129 as there is no specific guidance as to the meaning of ‘bad faith’ set out specifically in 
§1129. 
 
106
  See discussion in Part ___, infra. 
 
107
  The wording of § 17526 itself makes this clear by stating that:  “In determining whether there is a 
bad faith intent pursuant to Section 17525, a court may consider factors, including, but not limited to, the 
following…”  [Thereafter follows the list of bad faith factors.] 
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affiliation, or endorsement of the site.  
 
(f) The offer by a person alleged to be in violation of this  
article to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to the 
rightful owner or any third party for substantial consideration 
without having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in 
the bona fide offering of any goods or services.  
 
… 
(h) The registration or acquisition by the person alleged to be in 
violation of this article of multiple domain names that are identical 
or confusingly similar to names of other living persons or deceased 
personalities.  
 
(i) Whether the person alleged to be in violation of this article sought 
or obtained consent from the rightful owner to register, traffic in, or 
use the domain name.” 
 
Sub-sections (e) and (f) are borrowed relatively directly from the policies and 
principles underlying both the ACPA and the UDRP.  While they appear potentially to 
have some application to political cybersquatting, they both relate to trademark concepts 
– likelihood of confusion108 in the case of sub-section (e) and bona fide offering of goods 
or services109 in the case of sub-section (f).  It may be that courts interpreting these 
provisions in the political cybersquatting context would take the view that these bad faith 
factors are related to situations akin to trademark infringement or traditional commercial 
cybersquatting, and do not apply to political cybersquatting. 
 
Sub-section (h) is borrowed directly from the ACPA,110 which in turn was drafted 
in response to cases where cybersquatters registered multiple domain names 
corresponding with well-known trademarks.111  It may or may not have application in a 
political cybersquatting case, depending on the circumstances.  In fact, in both the 
                                                 
108
  15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)(requiring consumer confusion for registered trademark infringement 
action); 1125(a)(1)(A)(requiring consumer confusion for common law trademark infringement action). 
 
109
  15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)(requiring commercial exploitation of relevant goods or services for 
registered trademark infringement action); 1125(a)(1)(A)(requiring commercial exploitation of relevant 
goods or services for common law trademark infringement action). 
 
110
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII) (contemplating as a ‘bad faith factor’ under the trademark-
based provisions of the ACPA the defendant’s:  “registration or acquisition of multiple domain names 
which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others that are distinctive at the 
time of registration of such domain names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the time 
of registration of such domain names, without regard to the goods or services of the parties…”). 
 
111
  Such as the conduct of Mr Dennis Toeppen in the early days of Internet domain name disputes.  
See Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting:  Taking Domain Name Disputes Past Trademark Policy, 40 
WAKE FOREST L R 1361, 1370-1371 (2005). 
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commercial and political context, it is obviously possible for an alleged cybersquatter not 
to register multiple domain names, hoping instead to make a profit from the auction of 
just one particularly promising name.   
 
Sub-section (i) might be the most fruitful avenue for a politician concerned about 
political cybersquatting.  The one obvious problem with the section is that it is not clear 
who is a ‘rightful owner’ of a relevant domain name and on what theoretical basis.  
Under modern trademark law it appears to have been assumed in many circumstances, 
including the passage of the ACPA, that a trademark holder is a ‘legitimate holder’ of a 
corresponding domain name, at least as against bad faith cybersquatters.  It is possible 
that the same may not hold true for politicians who may or may not be able to trademark 
their personal names.  On the other hand, if one takes the view that any form of 
cybersquatting, including political cybersquatting, is inherently socially and economically 
wasteful, then it might be easier to argue that a politician is the ‘rightful owner’ of a 
corresponding domain name in this context.  Thus, § 17526(i) might prove useful to 
politicians who are the victims of political cybersquatting, depending on how courts 
interpret the scope of this bad faith factor. 
 
The Californian Business and Professions Code also currently has the same 
practical problems for politicians as the PCAA.  It is untested state legislation which has 
not been adopted in other jurisdictions and, while it may serve as a useful “legislative 
‘laboratory’”112 on many issues related to cybersquatting, it is not likely to be of much 
immediate assistance to politicians concerned about this conduct.     
 
E.  POLITICAL CYBERSQUATTING:  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
 
There are obviously various different avenues that can be pursued by politicians 
concerned about political cybersquatting, depending on the context of the relevant 
conduct and the jurisdiction.  If, for example, a politician can establish trademark rights 
in her name, like Senator Clinton has done,113 she will have more options for reprisal 
against a cybersquatter, as she might avail herself of the trademark-based provisions of 
the ACPA114 or the UDRP, as well as some of the other remedies discussed in the 
                                                 
112
  REPORT TO CONGRESS:  THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1999, 
SECTION 3006 CONCERNING THE ABUSIVE REGISTRATION OF DOMAIN NAMES, (last viewed on March 14, 
2007 and available at:  http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/tmcybpiracy/repcongress.pdf), ¶ IV 
(“California may serve as a legislative ‘laboratory’ on [the issue of use of personal names in domain 
names].”) 
 
113
  Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia a/k/a SZL.com (National Arbitration Forum Claim No. 
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005) (last viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (“The Panel finds that Complainant’s uncontested allegations 
establish common law rights in the HILLARY CLINTON mark sufficient to grant standing under the 
UDRP.  Complainant alleges that the HILLARY CLINTON mark has become distinctive through 
Complainant’s use and exposure of the mark in the marketplace and through use of the mark in connection 
with Complainant’s political activities, including a successful Senate campaign.”) 
  
114
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1). 
 
 POLITICAL SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE 
  28 
preceding sections.  She might also be able to mount a traditional trademark infringement 
action if she can establish the requisite elements for such an action, including likelihood 
of consumer confusion.115  In the absence of a trademark right, other remedies might be 
available, such as those arising under the ‘personal name’ provisions of the ACPA,116 as 
well as potentially actions under the right of publicity or various state cyberfraud117 and 
cybersquatting legislation118 where available. 
 
The main problem with the current legal framework is that it is piecemeal and 
quite context-specific with respect to political cybersquatting.  Much will depend on 
factors such as the jurisdiction in which the politician and registrant are located or in 
which the domain name was registered, as well as on whether the politician can establish 
a trademark right in her name.  Additionally, the system is not nationally or globally 
harmonized in a way that effectively deals with a problem that often has national or 
global dimensions.  Particularly in the context of a presidential election, people all around 
the United States as well as other countries may want to register domain names 
corresponding with potential candidates’ names with an intent to seek profit from the sale 
of the names.119  Whatever the view one takes of cybersquatting generally, political 
cybersquatting in particular clearly adds costs to an electoral system without providing 
any specific benefits.  Creating markets for valuable political domain names and 
effectively holding the names hostage awaiting the highest bidder can be wasteful, 
particularly in the electoral context which is time-sensitive.   
 
One obvious answer to this problem, and to some other associated problems, 
would be to legislatively ban all forms of cybersquatting.  In other words, a general rule 
could be adopted on the national or international level prohibiting all registrations of 
domain names where the intent is to profit from selling the name rather than any 
legitimate use or purpose of the name in the hands of the registrant.  This would overlap 
with the current trademark-based regulations,120 but that should not be a problem.  It 
would prohibit political cybersquatting as well as other conduct that wastes a potentially 
valuable resource.121  Alternatively, one could do the same thing with respect only to 
                                                 
115
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
 
116
  15 U.S.C. § 1129. 
 
117
  For example, California’s PCAA:  Cal. Elec. Code, 18320-23 (Deering Supp. 2005). 
 
118
  For example, California’s Business and Professions Code, § 17525(a). 
 
119
  See discussion in Steve Friess, As Candidates Mull ’08, Web Sites Are Already Running, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES, A13 (November 18, 2006) (noting global reach of this issue). 
 
120
  Such as the ACPA and the UDRP. 
 
121
  A good example of such alternate conduct would be conduct that might be termed ‘anticipatory 
cybersquatting’ – where a registrant registers multiple domain names that do not necessarily correspond 
with trademarks or personal names, but rather correspond with general ideas that may be valuable in a 
particular field of commerce.  For example, a registrant might register multiple variations of the word 
‘sports’, ‘cars’, or ‘movies’ in a domain name – say, ‘cars.com’, ‘motorcars.com’, ‘carworld.com’, 
‘caruniverse.com’.  If the registrant registers enough of these variations, she could effectively pre-empt 
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political cybersquatting, depending on the willingness of relevant regulatory bodies to 
legislate more or less broadly on the question.   
 
One problem with establishing such legal rules – either generally or specific to the 
political situation - is precisely how they should be enacted and enforced.  This is not 
necessarily a new question.  It was confronted to some extent by the drafters of the 
ACPA and the UDRP, not to mention the various Californian statutes described above.122  
However, legislation dealing with politician’s names or with cybersquatting generally 
outside the trademark context may raise some new issues. 
 
A purely domestic solution would require either federal legislation or uniform 
state legislation.  The downside of federal legislation is establishing which federal 
constitutional head of legislative power might support such a regulation.  Perhaps the 
commerce power123 could be used on the basis that the conduct in question potentially 
affects communications and commerce124 across all states.  However, this would not 
necessarily deter cybersquatters from outside the United States engaging in this conduct.  
It is cheap and easy to register a domain name, even a ‘.com’ domain name, in many 
different countries outside the United States.125  Thus, a federal legislative package would 
require a jurisdictional provision, like the ‘in rem’ provisions in the ACPA.126  State 
legislation, on the other hand, would not raise the federal legislative power issues, but 
would raise difficulties of creating a statute on which federal legislatures could 
substantially agree.  It may also raise jurisdictional concerns and require in rem 
provisions in case of domain name registrants situated outside the relevant jurisdiction. 
 
The same may be said of approaches that seek to extend on the current state laws 
that deal more broadly with bad faith domain name registrations than the ACPA.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
anyone who wanted to register a domain name to sell cars and hold relevant domain names for ransom for 
an exorbitant fee.  This would mean that the person wanting to enter the field could have to pay hundreds or 
thousands, or even millions, of dollars for a relevant domain name instead of the standard registration fee of 
ten to twenty dollars.   
 
122
  Cal. Elec. Code, 18320-23 (Deering Supp. 2005), and Business and Professions Code, § 17525(a). 
 
123
  U.S. Constitution, Art 1, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress shall have power:  “To regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States…”). 
 
124
  This approach was taken by Judge Wood in Planned Parenthood Federation of American Inc v 
Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (in interpreting the application of the Lanham Act to a domain 
name dispute, the judge noted that the statute, based on Congress’ commerce power, applies to Internet 
domain name registrations and uses because they are part of interstate commerce both on the basis that 
websites can provide commercial and informational services in multiple states and on the basis that Internet 
users constitute a national and international audience who must use interstate telephone lines to access the 
Internet), 10-12 (LEXIS page references). 
 
125
  See, for example, the global list of domain name registries accredited by ICANN at 
http://www.internic.net/origin.html (last viewed on March 14, 2007). 
 
126
  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii). 
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two Californian statutes discussed above127 are obvious examples here.  One difficulty 
with extending these laws would come partly in the substantive drafting of the 
provisions: that is, clarifying the current gaps in the legislation where political 
cybersquatting is concerned, such as adding a new ‘bad faith’ factor to the § 17526 of the 
Business and Professions Code specifically to cover political cybersquatting.  Another 
problem would arise in terms of the procedural aspects of harmonizing the laws to 
encompass more jurisdictions.  That would raise the same problems discussed in the 
previous paragraph about federal or harmonized state legislation to prohibit all forms of 
cybersquatting generally or political cybersquatting specifically.  These problems are not 
impossible to overcome, but they could prove time consuming and expensive, 
particularly for legislation that has not yet been substantially judicially tested in any state. 
 
An alternative, and perhaps more obvious solution, would be to add specific 
personal name protections to the UDRP.  In other words, where the UDRP is currently 
limited to protecting trademark-based rights from cybersquatting,128 it could also be 
extended to protect personal names against cybersquatting.129  This could be limited to 
politician’s names or could extend more broadly to celebrities and other public figures.130  
The broader approach would certainly cover some difficult situations that have arisen to 
date under the UDRP.131  However, the narrower approach, focused purely on politicians’ 
                                                 
127
  Cal. Elec. Code, 18320-23 (Deering Supp. 2005), and Business and Professions Code, § 17525(a). 
 
128
  UDRP, clause 4(a)(i) (requiring complainant to establish trademark interest as a requisite element 
of a UDRP claim). 
 
129
  As considered, but ultimately rejected, in the second WIPO report on the domain name process:  
WIPO, Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process:  The Recognition of Rights and the Use of Names in 
the Internet Domain Name System, Sept 3, 2001 (last viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/processes/process2/report/html/report.html#5), ¶¶202-203 (“It is 
recommended that no modification be made to the UDRP to accommodate broader protection for personal 
names than that which currently exists in the UDRP ..... In making this recommendation, we are conscious 
of the strength of feeling that the unauthorized, bad faith registration and use of personal names as domain 
names engenders.  We believe, however, that the most appropriate way in which the strength of this feeling 
should be expressed is through the development of international norms that can provide clear guidance on 
the intentions and will of the international community.”). 
 
130
  id. 
 
131
  Such as the case of celebrities who are undoubtedly well-known but who have been found not 
necessarily to hold common law trademark rights in their personal names.  See, for example, Springsteen v 
Burgar, Case No D2000-1532 (WIPO Arb. and Medication Ctr., Admin. Panel Decision, Jan. 5, 2001) 
(involving Bruce Springsteen’s name) (last viewed on march 14, 2007 and available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html), ¶ 6 (“It is common ground 
that there is no registered trade mark in the name "Bruce Springsteen". In most jurisdictions where trade 
marks are filed it would be impossible to obtain a registration of a name of that nature. Accordingly, Mr 
Springsteen must rely on common law rights to satisfy this element of the three part test.  It appears to be 
an established principle from cases such as Jeanette Winterson, Julia Roberts, and Sade that in the case of 
very well known celebrities, their names can acquire a distinctive secondary meaning giving rise to rights 
equating to unregistered trade marks, notwithstanding the non-registerability of the name itself. It should be 
noted that no evidence has been given of the name "Bruce Springsteen" having acquired a secondary 
meaning; in other words a recognition that the name should be associated with activities beyond the 
primary activities of Mr. Springsteen as a composer, performer and recorder of popular music.  In the view 
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names might be simpler and less confusing at least in the short term.  This is because of 
the fundamental importance to the democratic process of free and accurate information 
about politicians, particularly in the lead-up to an election.  Celebrities presumably have 
less trouble under the UDRP, as currently drafted, than politicians because celebrities are 
more likely to be able to establish trademark-like rights in their names, given that their 
names and images are used predominantly for commercial purposes.  This may be 
compared with politicians who may or may not have established commercially valuable 
personas.  A politician who wants to avoid commercialization of her image may thus 
currently be disadvantaged under the UDRP.  The same may be said of a less ‘famous’ 
politician who has not yet established a major public persona.  An extension of the UDRP 
rules to cover politicians’ personal names would correct these imbalances in the system.  
Such an extension is also arguably more important at the current time than a specific 
extension of the UDRP to cover personal names of classes of people outside the political 
arena. 
 
The main advantages with this approach over federal and state legislation are 
many.  The UDRP procedures are fast, inexpensive and international in scope.  The 
remedies available under the UDRP are precisely the kinds of remedies a politician will 
want in a political cybersquatting case – an arbitral order that the domain name in 
question be transferred to the politician.  The addition of a ‘politician’s name protection’ 
provision to the UDRP would be a minor drafting change and could be achieved quickly 
and simply.     
 
III.  POLITICAL CYBERFRAUD 
 
A.  DISTINGUISHING CYBERFRAUD FROM CYBERSQUATTING 
 
“Political cyberfraud” is defined in this article to include various categories of bad 
faith content involving registration of a domain name corresponding with a politician’s 
name.  It differs from “political cybersquatting” in that it looks to the substantive content 
of the relevant website in association with the domain name, rather than a simple attempt 
to sell the domain name.  Examples of cyberfraud would include publishing misleading 
or damaging information on a website about the relevant politician or a fraudulent 
attempt to raise funds in the name of the politician under a domain name corresponding 
with the politician’s name.  The substantive content of a relevant website may or may not 
be ‘legitimate’ in a strictly legal sense.  However, cyberfraud is concerned with 
publishing the content in concert with a domain name correspond to a politician’s name 
in a manner that appears to cloak the speech with a misleading sense of authority or 
truthfulness. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
of this Panel, it is by no means clear from the UDRP that it was intended to protect proper names of this 
nature. As it is possible to decide the case on other grounds, however, the Panel will proceed on the 
assumption that the name Bruce Springsteen is protected under the policy; it then follows that the domain 
name at issue is identical to that name.”)  
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This assumes, of course, that Internet users would expect that a domain name 
such as, say, ‘ralphnader.com’ would resolve to a website actually authorized, sponsored, 
or maintained by Ralph Nader.  In some ways, this is similar to presumptions that appear 
to be developing in commercial trademark law with respect to domain names 
corresponding with well-known trademarks.  There is now some authority that 
‘trademark.com’ names will resolve to websites authorized or sponsored by relevant 
trademark holders.132 
 
A domain name registrant committing ‘cyberfraud’ may or may not have an 
additional purpose to sell the domain name, but cyberfraud and cybersquatting are treated 
differently in this article for a number of reasons.  Cyberfraud will obviously raise more 
difficult issues of subjective judgment than cybersquatting because when the focus turns 
to evaluating the substantive content of a website, more difficult interpretive questions 
will arise than in cases of pure waste of a domain name resource.  This is why, in many 
ways, pure cybersquatting will be much easier to regulate than cyberfraud.  It will likely 
be much less contentious and will simply be a way of preserving available forums for 
political debate and preventing waste of those resources, particularly during elections.  
Cyberfraud, on the other hand, might involve promoting certain kinds of political speech 
above other kinds of political speech in an electoral context.  Not only might these 
questions be much more subjective than questions involving pure cybersquatting, but 
their resolutions might differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from culture to culture.  
Thus, regulation should probably be as minimally invasive of speech as possible, and 
these issues might lend themselves more appropriately to local, rather than global, 
regulation, again unlike cybersquatting. 
 
Additionally, some aspects of conduct described here as cyberfraud may already 
be covered by relevant local laws and may not, in fact, need as much legislative or 
regulatory reform as pure political cybersquatting.  The promulgation of defamatory 
messages about a politician on a website regardless of the domain name used may well be 
the subject of a successful defamation action under current law.  Attempting to defraud 
the public and raise money fraudulently under a politician’s name (and domain name) 
would presumably contravene various criminal statutes.133  Of course, conduct like this 
arguably has two parts:  one is the website content and the other is the unauthorized use 
of a domain name corresponding with a politician’s name.  It may be that current 
defamation and fraud laws cover much of the conduct relating to web content, but that it 
                                                 
132
  See discussion in Part ___, infra. 
 
133
  The Federal Department of Justice has defined “Internet Fraud” as follows:  “The term "Internet 
fraud" refers generally to any type of fraud scheme that uses one or more components of the Internet - such 
as chat rooms, e-mail, message boards, or Web sites - to present fraudulent solicitations to prospective 
victims, to conduct fraudulent transactions, or to transmit the proceeds of fraud to financial institutions or 
to other connected with the scheme.”  (see Department of Justice, Internet Fraud, last viewed on March 14, 
2007 and available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/Internet.htm).  While the Department of Justice 
does not appear to be actively focusing on political fraud at this time, it appears to be increasingly 
concerned with criminal prosecutions for Internet fraud generally. 
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is necessary to have additional laws relating to the use of a domain name corresponding 
to a politician’s name in this context.   
 
This might be somewhat akin to the registration of a domain name corresponding 
with a trademark to promulgate a misleading or deceptive message about the trademark 
holder.  Such conduct has been variously dealt with under current trademark laws.  
However, it raises additional dimensions in the political context because of the 
importance of free speech in political discourse.  Additionally, it is arguable that legal 
regulation in the political context, compared with the trademark context, should not be 
based on the notion of a property-like right in a personal name.  While trademarks have 
clearly attained a property-like status within our legal system,134 it is not clear that 
politician’s names have achieved a similar status.  Even in the context of the right of 
publicity, it is not clear that politician’s names should be treated in the same was as 
celebrities’ names because of the trademark-like status of a celebrity’s persona compared 
to a politician’s name and likeness.135   
 
In the political context, it is more appropriate for the theoretical basis underlying 
the protection of a politician’s name in a corresponding domain space to reside in notions 
of democratic government and free speech, rather than in notions of property.  It seems 
intuitive that at least the most obvious iterations of a politician’s name should be 
protected in a domain space for that politician’s own purposes.  This probably accords 
with voter expectations and is likely the most effective presumption for preserving and 
facilitating political debate, particularly in an electoral context.  However, the reservation 
of the domain name – or at least ‘first rights’ in the domain name – to the politician in 
question should not extend to blocking all iterations of that person’s name in the domain 
space for legitimate political discussion purposes.  In other words, if someone wanted to 
register ‘hillarysucks.com’ for a website critical of Senator Clinton, that should be 
permitted if the more obvious versions of her name are reserved to Senator Clinton – 
such as ‘hillaryclinton.com’. 
 
To this end, even if the theoretical basis underlying protection of a politician’s 
name in the domain space is different from the theory behind protecting a trademark 
holder’s interest in a domain name, the results may be similar.  If the social expectations 
are that the ‘rightful’ holder of the name is the politician or the trademark-holder, 
depending on the context, it is possible to draw into the political context some principles 
                                                 
134
  Trademarks are often colloquially referred to as ‘property’ rights although technically they are not 
‘property’ in more traditional senses of the word:  Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley, Trademarks and 
Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW 777, 788 (2004) (“trademarks are not 
property rights in gross, but limited entitlements to protect against uses that diminish the informative value 
of marks”); Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE LAW 
JOURNAL 1687, 1687-1688 (1999) (“Commentators and even courts increasingly talk about trademarks as 
property rights; as things valuable in and of themselves, rather than for the product goodwill they 
embody.”). 
 
135
  As noted in Part ___, supra, a politician’s public persona is often not based on commercial 
activities, but rather activities in the public service realm. 
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that have been developed in the trademark context to date.  This is not because a 
politician’s rights in her name should necessarily be equated to property rights, although 
that is possible.  Rather, it is because the Internet is an important communications system 
and the domain name system is a significant method for users to navigate that system.  
Thus, the protection of social expectations in the domain space, whether those 
expectations are based on theories of representative democracy, or commercial trademark 
law, should be a paramount concern of regulators in this area.  This appears to have been 
the case in the commercial trademark context where a presumption already seems to be 
developing in domain name disputes that ‘trademark.com’ names are reserved to 
legitimate trademark holders, while ‘trademarksucks.com’ names can be used 
legitimately for purposes of criticism and commentary consistent with the First 
Amendment.136  Thus, the same may be said of political domain names – the 
‘politicianname.com’ version could be reserved to the politician while other variations 
could be presumed to be available for otherwise lawful comment about the politician: that 
is, comment that is not defamatory or fraudulent.   
 
Again, some of the Californian legislation relating to bad faith registrations and 
uses of a domain name may prove to be a good legislative testing ground for these kinds 
of issues and might inform debate at the federal level – or at least lead to a more 
harmonized state-based approach to some of these issues.  Although a number of 
practical procedural problems arise with respect to legislation as opposed to revision of 
the UDRP, as discussed supra,137 value judgments about balancing rights to political 
speech in the electoral context might be best left to local judges interpreting local 
legislation, as opposed to arbitrators within a global system.  Arbitrators may be well 
versed in trademark law and domain name regulation generally, but may have little 
familiarity with local laws relating to free speech and the democratic process – and may 
have different cultural and political ideals in this context, depending on their respective 
locations and backgrounds. 
 
B.  CALIFORNIA’S POLITICAL CYBERFRAUD LEGISLATION 
 
                                                 
136
  However, such a presumption is not uniformly accepted.  Compare, for example, Bridgetsone-
Firestone v Myers, Case No, D2000-0190, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, July 6, 2000, (last 
viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0190.html), ¶6 (“The Panel sees no 
reason to require domain name registrants to utilize circumlocutions like www.trademarksucks.com to 
designate a website for criticism or consumer commentary.”); Societé Air France v Virtual Dates Inc, Case 
No. D2005-0168 (WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, May 24, 2005) (majority of arbitration panel 
found that ‘airfrancesucks.com’ domain name was sufficiently confusing to consumers to order the name to 
be transferred to the relevant trademark holder – Air France).  For a detailed discussion of relevant case law 
in the commercial arena, see Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks, and the First Amendment:  
Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONNECTICUT L R 973 (2007).  See also Jacqueline Lipton, 
Commerce vs Commentary:  Gripe Sites, Parody and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY L R, forthcoming, 2007. 
 
137
  See discussion in Part ___, supra. 
 
 POLITICAL SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE 
  35 
Unsurprisingly, California’s Political Cyberfraud Abatement Act (“PCAA”) 
appears to be a good legislative model expressly targeted to the kinds of conduct 
described in this article as ‘political cyberfraud’.  However, the provisions of the PCAA 
are intended to be broader than to apply simply to protect domain names corresponding 
specifically to politician’s names from misleading and deceptive uses.  Thus, there may 
be some difficulties and inconsistencies in applying the legislation in this context.  The 
legislation prohibits conduct of the three classes referred to in the previous section: that 
is, (a) attempts to deny a person access to a political website,138 (b) attempts to deny a 
person the opportunity to register a domain name for a political website,139 and, (c) 
activities concerning a web site that would cause a person to believe that the website 
actually represents the views of a proponent or opponent of a ballot measure.140  Probably 
classes (b) and (c) are the most relevant to the kind of conduct under consideration here, 
although some such conduct may arguably fall within class (a).   
 
Class (a) may be less relevant here because if a person registers a domain name 
corresponding with a polician’s name to promulgate a misleading or deceptive message 
about the politician, she may or may not have actually ‘denied the person access to a 
political website’.  The access question would depend upon whether the politician in 
question still had access to any relevant domain names to promulgate her own political 
message.  If the domain name registrant had registered multiple domain names 
corresponding to the politician’s name and had cut off access to the most obvious 
iterations of the name, such as ‘name.com’ and ‘name.org’, this might be an example of 
cutting off access to a political website as contemplated in class (a).  However, this may 
also be regarded as ‘cybersquatting’ under the relevant cybersquatting regulations, 
particularly if there is a corresponding attempt to profit from sale of the name.  Thus, the 
cybersquatting laws may deal effectively with access questions in the multiple domain 
name registration context, and cyberfraud of the kind contemplated in this article could 
be addressed squarely under classes (b) and (c) of legislation like the PCAA. 
 
Class (b) would obviously cover situations where a person registers a domain 
name corresponding with a politician’s name with a view to denying the politician the 
opportunity to register that domain name.  It is, of course, arguable that class (b) conduct 
may not be judicially interpreted this broadly under the PCAA if this provision were read 
as prohibiting attempts to deny a person the opportunity to register any domain name, as 
opposed to a particular domain name.  In other words, it is not clear on the face of the 
statute whether the prohibition applies only to situations where the domain name 
registrant has effectively cut off access to any relevant web presence via her registration 
of relevant domain names, or has cut off access to one specific domain name.  The 
legislative phrase ‘to deny a person the opportunity to register a domain name for a 
political Web site’141 is ambiguous in this context.  Does the indefinite article refer to one 
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  PCAA, § 18320(c)(1). 
 
139
  id. 
 
140
  id. 
 
141
  id. 
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or many domain names here?  Again, one might need to consider precisely which 
iterations of the politician’s name had been registered.  The denial of ‘name.com’ and 
‘name.org’ to the politician should perhaps raise more red flags than ‘namesucks.com’ or 
even the less pejorative, but also less intuitive, ‘nameinfo.com’ or even ‘name.info’. 
 
Class (c) may be more promising for victims of the kind of political cyberfraud 
under discussion in this article.  This class refers to conduct that causes an Internet user to 
believe that a website has been posted by someone other than the person who posted it.  
This would clearly contemplate conduct where a person registered a domain name 
corresponding with a politician’s name for the purposes of promulgating a misleading 
message about the politician’s views.  Some of these situations may also be caught by 
defamation law, depending on the content of the website.  However, the PCAA may well 
cast a broader net here and be cheaper and easier to litigate that defamation.  All that a 
victim of class (c) conduct would have to prove is that the way the website in question 
has been used suggests an affiliation with the relevant politician that does not exist.  This 
could be established by proving that the defendant had registered a domain name 
corresponding with the politician’s name to provide messages about the politician 
regardless of whether the messages were defamatory or not.  The ‘misleading’ conduct 
would simply be using the politician’s name in the domain name for an unauthorized, 
unofficial website about the politician.142   
 
Taking this view of the interpretation of class (c) conduct is somewhat akin to the 
developing trademark law principle that ‘trademark.com’ names should be reserved to 
legitimate trademark holders on the basis that any other presumption would potentially 
mislead consumers or dilute the relevant trademark.  Taking this analogy further, it may 
be that registering a ‘namesucks.com’ domain name would not fall afoul of this provision 
on the basis that adding an obviously pejorative term to the politician’s name in the 
domain space would not mislead Internet users to think that the site actually reflected the 
relevant politician’s views. 
 
In sum, legislative provisions like some of those found in the PCAA might be 
good models for providing politicians with some protection against political cyberfraud, 
as well as cybersquatting in some cases.  Such provisions may prove to be an effective 
complement to defamation laws applied online to the extent that those laws sufficiently 
protect politicians – and public expectations – against the kind of conduct contemplated 
here.  Because ‘cyberfraud’ is a somewhat more subjective term than ‘cybersqsuatting’, 
at least as contemplated in this article, it may not matter if protection for politicians here 
is piecemeal and derives organically through the development of state legislation as 
interpreted by the courts.  Ultimately, this might be the most effective way of developing 
appropriate legislative and judicial presumptions to protect free speech during an election 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
142
  There may be some First Amendment concerns here as to whether, in this context, this provision, 
or any similar provision that may ever be debated at the federal level, would survive judicial scrutiny as a 
content-based restriction on First Amendment freedoms.  At the date of writing, there is, as yet, no judicial 
interpretation on relevant issues, such as whether such a provision could be regarded as a content-based 
restriction on speech and, if so, whether it would survive strict scrutiny. 
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campaign in the most effective way possible – in order both to facilitate politicians 
disseminating their messages to voters as well as to facilitate general engagement with 
the political process by the public.  Questions about where lines should be drawn between 
conduct that amounts to ‘cyberfraud’ and legitimate comment about a politician should 
perhaps best be left to courts and state legislatures to develop over time.   
 
Some presumptions from domain name disputes involving trademark rights may 
be useful here as described in the previous section.  An obvious example is the adoption 
of a presumption that ‘name.com’ and perhaps ‘name.org’ domains be reserved to 
relevant politicians while other variations of those names such as ‘namesucks.com’ or 
‘namecommentary.com’ should be made available for legitimate, if unauthorized, 
comments about politicians.   
 
C.  LAWS PROTECTING PERSONAL REPUTATION 
 
Some of the ‘personal reputation’ laws discussed with respect to political 
cybersquatting supra may also have some application to political cyberfraud.  
Defamation is an obvious contender here.  Also, the right of publicity may have some 
application, although this seems less likely because of the focus of that right on attempts 
to use a famous name or likeness to commercialize on the success of another, as opposed 
to commenting on another.  State legislation like California’s Business and Professions 
Code may have some application here, although it is more clearly directed to 
cybersquatting conduct.  As described in the cybersquatting discussion supra, § 17525(a) 
of the Code prohibits the bad faith registration, trafficking or use of a domain name that 
is identical or confusingly similar to the personal name of another person.  This would 
certainly cover the registration or use of a domain name corresponding with a politician’s 
name for ‘bad faith’ purposes such as promulgating a misleading message about the 
politician.  Again, it will be task for the judiciary to establish the boundaries of ‘bad faith’ 
in this context.  Looking at the legislative guidance on bad faith within the statute, three 
classes of conduct described in the legislation may be particularly relevant to political 
cyberfraud.  They are found in §§ 17526(e), (i) and (j) respectively.   
 
Sub-section 17526(e) contemplates as a bad faith factor: “The intent of a person 
… to divert consumers from the person’s … online location to a site accessible under the 
domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by the person’s … name either 
for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the person’s … name by 
creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or 
endorsement of the site.”  As noted in the preceding discussion, this section is written in 
trademark-based language with its references to goodwill and likelihood of confusion.  
However, as also acknowledged above, it is possible to draw some lessons for the 
political context from trademark presumptions developed in the domain space.  If the 
assumption is made that a website bearing a ‘name.com’ or ‘name.org’ domain is 
expected to resolve to an official website of the politician in question, it may well be 
regarded as bad faith conduct for someone other than the politician to create a website 
about the politician using such a name.   
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The legislation here is concerned with both profit and consumer confusion 
motives – which seem to connote both cybersquatting and cyberfraud.  Some cyberfraud 
will fall within the concept of confusing consumers about the endorsement of a particular 
website, regardless of whether the registrant had an intent to profit from selling the name 
or not.  Whether or not the conduct will amount to cyberfraud will depend on the content 
of the website in conjunction with the use of a politician’s name, unlike cybersquatting 
which only needs to look at the registration of the name and a bad faith attempt to profit 
from its sale, regardless of website content.  Thus, the Business and Professions Code 
may cover either or both types of conduct depending on the context.  It may be that a 
particular registrant has engaged in both cybersqsuatting and cyberfraud simultaneously, 
although this will not always be the case.  The use of a domain name corresponding 
letter-for-letter with a politician’s name where the website promulgates misleading 
messages about the politician as well as offering to sell the domain name to the highest 
bidder would clearly infringe the Code and amount to both cyberfraud and cybersquatting 
conduct.  However, a simple attempt to sell such a name without utilizing any web 
content about the politician could be prohibited under the legislation per se as 
cybersquatting.  On the other hand, the use of the same domain name in concert with 
content that confuses readers about endorsement by a particular politician143 could 
contravene the legislation and amount to cyberfraud. 
 
Sub-section 17526(i) of the Code contemplates as an indicia of bad faith whether 
a domain name registrant ‘sought or obtained consent from the rightful owner to register, 
traffic in, or use the domain name’.  If we presume a politician is the ‘rightful owner’ of a 
domain name corresponding with her personal name, this provision will certainly cover 
some cyberfraud.  The question will always be context-specific with respect to the 
domain name actually registered and presumptions about the identity of the ‘rightful 
owner’ of that name.  While we may accept a presumption that Senator Hillary Clinton is 
the ‘rightful owner’ of ‘hillaryclinton.com’, is she also the rightful owner of other 
variations on her name like ‘hillaryclintonsucks.com’, ‘hillarycriticism.com’ or even 
‘whyhillary.com’, ‘voteforhillary.com’ or ‘voteagainsthillary.com’?  If we regard one 
single politician as the ‘rightful owner’ of all variations of her name, this may well chill 
political speech overall.  However, by the same token, there should be some domain 
space reserved for legitimate political messages to be directly communicated by the 
relevant politician to the public.   
 
Finally, sub-section 17526(j) of the Code contemplates as a bad faith factor the 
intent of a domain name registrant ‘to mislead, deceive, or defraud voters’.  While not so 
relevant to cybersquatting, this provision has particular relevance for cyberfraud because 
of its focus on the use of the name to interfere with the electoral process content-wise.  It 
must at least implicitly refer to the content of the relevant website and the relationship 
between web content and the domain name in question.   
 
Legislation such as California’s Business and Professions Code may well have 
some role to play in developing the framework for political cyberfraud, as well as 
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  For example, a deliberate misspelling of the politician’s name or a ‘politiciansucks.com’ name. 
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potentially political cybersquatting.  As with provisions of the PCAA, it may be worth 
watching the interpretation of this legislation and treating California as a laboratory for 
testing how courts interpret all of this legislation with respect to both political 
cybersquatting and political cyberfraud.  Obviously, state legislation that has no, or few, 
analogs in other states can only provide a limited testing ground for the development of 
relevant principles.  It may be desirable for more states to experiment with such laws in 
the interests of developing clearer principles about the appropriate boundaries for domain 
name use in the electoral context, although this could also lead to disharmonization, 
particularly in the context of a federal election. 
 
D.  POLITICAL CYBERFRAUD AND THE ANTI-CYBERSQUATTING REGULATIONS 
 
Other regulations may also overlap in their application to political cyberfraud and 
political cybersquatting.  The regulations aimed directly at cybersquatting, like the ACPA 
and the UDRP, may well have applications in the cyberfraud area depending on the 
registrant’s conduct.  Even though each of these regulatory measures is premised on 
domain name registration or use with a bad faith profit motive,144 they may apply to cases 
of cyberfraud where the profit motive overlaps with misleading or deceptive use of a 
domain name in a political website.  Of course neither of these regulatory measures is 
likely to apply in the absence of a trademark interest in the politician’s name.  The one 
exception to this is the ‘personal name’ provisions of the ACPA which will protect a 
person (including a politician) against a bad faith registration of a domain name 
corresponding with that person’s name without that person’s consent.145   
 
Again, the theoretical basis of the consent requirement is not clear from the 
legislation.  As this is a trademark protection statute, it would seem that the 
Congressional power being exercised here is the commerce power and it is being used to 
create commercial property or property-like rights in domain names corresponding with 
personal names.  However, as noted in the previous section, it would seem more 
theoretically satisfying, at least in the political context, to base any rights in a domain 
name corresponding to a politician’s name on notions of democratic government rather 
than commercial property.  Obviously, the personal name provisions of the ACPA were 
not drafted with politics in mind, although some domain name arbitrators have suggested 
that these provisions are the most effective way for a politician who does not have a 
                                                 
144
  15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d)(1)(a)(i) (“a person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, 
including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this section, if, without regard to the goods or 
services of the parties, that person … has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark…”), 1129(1)(A) (“Any 
person who registers a domain name that consists of the name of another living person, or a name 
substantially and confusingly similar thereto, without that person’s consent, with the specific intent to profit 
from such name by selling the domain name for financial gain to that person or any third party, shall be 
liable in a civil action by such person.”) (emphases added). 
 
145
  15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) (“Any person who registers a domain name that consists of the name of 
another living person, or a name substantially and confusingly similar thereto, without that person’s 
consent, with the specific intent to profit from such name by selling the domain name for financial gain to 
that person or any third party, shall be liable in a civil action by such person.”) 
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trademark interest in her personal name to protect it against unauthorized incursions in 
the domain space.146 
 
The main problem with the personal name provisions in the ACPA147 is that they 
will not apply to any kind of cyberfraud unless there is a corresponding cybersquatting 
motive.  In other words, if there is no bad faith intent to sell the domain name in question, 
the personal name protections in the ACPA will not apply.148  Thus, if a registrant 
utilized a domain name corresponding with a politician’s name to make comments about 
the politician, no action would lie unless the registrant had also at some point attempted 
to sell the domain name to the politician or to someone else.149  Thus, the ACPA 
provisions will be limited to cases involving cybersquatting, even if they also involve 
cyberfraud.150  As such, they do not add much do a discussion of pure cyberfraud that 
does not involve such a bad faith profit motive. 
 
The UDRP may be a little different here.  Although, like the ACPA, it is premised 
on notions of bad faith cybersquatting, it is a little broader in its drafting in terms of 
coverage.  To establish a claim under the UDRP, a complainant needs to establish that the 
registrant: (a) has a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark in 
which the complainant has rights;151 (b) has no rights or legitimate interests in the 
name;152 and, (c) has registered and used the domain name in bad faith.153  Unlike an 
ACPA action, an attempt to actually sell the name154 – or make some other form of profit 
                                                 
146
  Friends of Kathleen Kennedy Townsend v Birt (WIPO Case No D2002-0451) (involving Kathleen 
Kennedy Townsend’s name) (last viewed at March 14, 2007 and available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0451.html), § 6 ("This does not mean that 
Complainant is without remedy. The ACPA contains express provisions protecting the rights in personal 
names.”)  
 
147
  15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A). 
 
148
  15 U.S.C. §1129(1)(A) (“Any person who registers a domain name that consists of the name of 
another living person, or a name substantially and confusingly similar thereto, without that person’s 
consent, with the specific intent to profit from such name by selling the domain name for financial gain to 
that person or any third party, shall be liable in a civil action by such person.” – emphasis added) 
 
149
  id. 
 
150
  The same is technically true of the more trademark focused provisions of the ACPA found in 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(d).  That section is requires a bad faith profit motive, although not necessarily a sale motive.  
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (setting out the ‘bad faith intent to profit’ from a trademark requirement 
in a trademark-based cybersquatting action, as distinct from the personal name protecting action in 15 
U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A)). 
 
151
  UDRP, cl. 4(a)(i). 
 
152
  UDRP, cl. 4(a)(ii). 
 
153
  UDRP, cl. 4(a)(iii)., 
 
154
  As required by 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) with respect to personal names. 
 
 POLITICAL SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE 
  41 
from the name in bad faith155 - is not necessary for a successful UDRP arbitration.  The 
main problem under the UDRP will be for a politician to establish trademark rights in her 
personal name.  If she can establish such rights, then it may be possible to bring a 
cyberfraud claim under the UDRP if she can prove that the registrant has no legitimate 
interest in the name and has used it in bad faith.   
 
The next problem would be in establishing the boundaries of ‘legitimate’ use and 
‘bad faith’ in this context.  The UDRP itself gives little guidance here.  Although UDRP 
arbitrators in the past have recognized free speech as a ‘legitimate interest’,156 this has 
occurred in the case of deciding the boundaries of protecting commercial trademark 
interests.157  Some have also presumed that free speech will be protected in this context 
provided that the registrant has not usurped the ‘.com’ version of the name which 
rightfully belongs to the trademark holder.158  It is obviously arguable that if free speech 
is protected as a legitimate interest under the UDRP in the commercial context, it should 
definitely be so protected in the political context.  However, the assumption in the 
commercial context is that the speech itself on the relevant website is ‘legitimate’: that is, 
the speech is a legitimate critique or commentary of the relevant trademark holder.159  It 
may be more difficult in the political context to establish whether particular speech is 
legitimate or, rather, amounts to ‘cyberfraud’ – because of the higher protections placed 
on protecting political speech over commercial speech in many jurisdictions.160  This may 
                                                 
155
  As required by 15 U.S.C. §1125(d)(1)(A)(i) with respect to trademark-based protections. 
 
156
  The UDRP ‘legitimate use’ factors do not contemplate free speech per se and are limited to the 
various legitimate commercial uses set out in clause 4(c) of the UDRP.  This list is not exclusive so 
arbitrators have had some leeway to extend on it.  This occurred in Bridgetsone-Firestone v Myers, Case 
No, D2000-0190, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, July 6, 2000, (last viewed on March 14, 2007 
and available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0190.html), ¶6 (“The 
question presented in this case is whether fair use and free speech are defenses to a claim for transfer of a 
domain name under the Policy. Under Paragraph 4 (c)(iii) of the Policy, noncommercial fair use is 
expressly made a defense, as noted above. Although free speech is not listed as one of the Policy’s 
examples of a right or legitimate interest in a domain name, the list is not exclusive, and the Panel 
concludes that the exercise of free speech for criticism and commentary also demonstrates a right or 
legitimate interest in the domain name under Paragraph 4 (c)(iii). The Internet is above all a framework for 
global communication, and the right to free speech should be one of the foundations of Internet law.”) 
 
157
  id.  (arbitration involving the Bridgestone-Firestone trademark). 
 
158
  id., ¶ 6 (In this case, the Respondent’s principal purpose in using the domain name appears not to 
be for commercial gain, but rather to exercise his First Amendment right to criticize the Complainants. The 
use of the <trademark.net> domain name appears to be for the communicative purpose of identifying the 
companies, which are the subject of his complaints. He is not misleadingly diverting users to his website, as 
he has not utilized the <.com > domain and has posted adequate disclaimers as to the source of the website. 
It does not appear that his actions are intended to tarnish, or have tarnished, the Complainants’ marks.”) 
 
159
  id. 
 
160
  See, for example, New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority, 987 F Supp 254, 260 
(1997) (“Speech is generally protected unless it falls in a category that removes it from the scope of First 
Amendment protection …. In order to determine the protection to be afforded to the speech in issue, it is 
necessary to decide whether it is entitled to full First Amendment protection or to the more limited 
protection accorded to what is known as “commercial speech.”  Once upon a time commercial speech was 
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thus be a very difficult task to place on the shoulders of UDRP arbitrators who are 
predominantly trained in commercial trademark law and not constitutional law in any 
given jurisdiction.  In other words, the boundaries of legitimate political speech under the 
UDRP may be broader than the boundaries of legitimate commercial speech.  However, 
UDRP arbitrators may not be the best arbiters of where the boundaries should lie in the 
political context.161 
 
As with the ‘legitimate interests’ test under the UDRP,162 the ‘bad faith’ use 
test163 is drafted in terms of commercial trademark uses such as misleading consumers as 
to affiliation or source of a particular good or service.164  The two ‘bad faith factors’ that 
may be relevant to political cyberfraud are: (a) evidence that the domain name has been 
acquired primarily for the purpose of selling it to a rightful trademark holder or to a 
competitor of that trademark holder;165 and, (b) evidence that the name has been acquired 
to prevent the trademark holder from reflecting its mark in a corresponding domain 
name.166  Although both of these factors are premised on the complainant holding 
trademark rights in the relevant name, a politician might be able to use them where she 
can establish that she holds such trademark rights.167   
 
E.  REGULATING CYBERFRAUD VS REGULATING CYBERSQUATTING 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
“deemed wholly outside the purview of the First Amendment.” …. Since 1976, however, the Supreme 
Court has consistently held that such speech is protected although it “is entitled to a lesser degree of 
protection than other forms of constitutionally guaranteed expression.”). 
 
161
  Of course, a counter-argument to this is that the UDRP is only intended to protect commercial 
trademark interests.  In the context of protecting trademarks corresponding to politicians’ names, maybe 
UDRP arbitrators are really only being asked the commercial question.  However, this could be confusing 
in practice if the politician in question is really concerned with defamation or other non-commercial 
reputational damage.  It may be better to label such situations as ‘pure cyberfraud’ situations and litigate 
them under relevant laws such as defamation or anti-cyberfraud laws, discussed supra. 
   
162
  UDRP, cl. 4(c). 
 
163
  UDRP, cl. 4(b). 
 
164
  UDRP, cl. 4(b)(iv). 
 
165
  UDRP, cl. 4(b)(i). 
 
166
  UDRP, cl. 4(b)(ii). 
 
167
  For example, Senator Hillary Clinton in the ‘hillaryclinton.com’ arbitration:  Hillary Rodham 
Clinton v Michele Dinoia a/k/a SZL.com (National Arbitration Forum Claim No. FA0502000414641, 
March 18, 2005) (last viewed on March 14, 2007 and available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (“The Panel finds that Complainant’s uncontested allegations 
establish common law rights in the HILLARY CLINTON mark sufficient to grant standing under the 
UDRP.  Complainant alleges that the HILLARY CLINTON mark has become distinctive through 
Complainant’s use and exposure of the mark in the marketplace and through use of the mark in connection 
with Complainant’s political activities, including a successful Senate campaign.”)  
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Probably the most confusing aspects of attempts to regulate political cyberfraud 
relate to understanding the relationship between political cyberfraud and political 
cybersquatting, and the reasons for distinguishing between the two.  It is easy to take a 
‘scattergun’ approach to regulation of both classes of conduct.  In fact, this describes the 
current regulatory situation.  It is a pastiche of laws that generally attempts to regulate all 
bad faith conduct relating to domain names, political or otherwise.  The problem is that 
these regulations have developed quickly in recent years without close scrutiny of 
precisely what conduct should be proscribed, particularly in a political context.  
Identifying the exact classes of conduct in question, as this article attempts to do, will 
help greatly in tailoring appropriate regulations and remedies that do the least damage to 
political discourse. 
 
Current regulatory measures overlap in a seemingly vague way with respect to 
political cyberfraud and political cybersquatting as demonstrated in the above discussion, 
despite the fact that the two classes of conduct raise quite different concerns and call for 
different kinds of remedies.  Although both classes of conduct may overlap in some 
situations, this will not invariably be the case.  Political cybersquatting raises issues of 
wasted political communications channels whereas political cyberfraud deals with 
fraudulent and misleading uses of a political domain name.  Political cybersquatting can 
thus be regulated fairly simply and mechanically – either a domain name is being used in 
a wasteful manner or not.  A simple arbitration procedure should be able to be 
implemented to determine this question.  On the other hand, political cyberfraud raises 
substantive questions of speech content in concert with a domain name that are better 
regulated by those who are experts in balancing legitimate political speech against 
illegitimate speech.  Where the two classes of conduct coincide in a given case, a 
complainant should be entitled to decide between the relevant remedial mechanisms, and 
should be able to avail herself of both if necessary. 
 
The problem is that current laws do not differentiate effectively between the two 
classes of conduct and, to the extent that the terms ‘political cybersquatting’ and ‘political 
cyberfraud’ are used at all, they tend to be used somewhat interchangeably.168  This will 
likely cause confusions and problems of interpretation of relevant regulations as political 
campaigns increasingly rely on the Internet and the domain name system in particular.169  
Now may be the time to start unraveling some of the policies underlying the regulation 
before the confusions become entrenched in the domain name system.  Similar 
confusions have already become entrenched in the system in the purely commercial 
context, involving the interpretation of the ACPA and the UDRP in trademark-based 
                                                 
168
  As noted in the discussion in Part ___, supra, California’s political cyberfraud legislation, for 
example, covers aspects of both cyberfraud and cybersquatting.  By the same token, anti-cybersquatting 
regulations such as the ACPA can cover aspects of cyberfraud where they coincide with cybersquatting in 
practice. 
 
169
  See discussion in Steve Friess, As Candidates Mull ’08, Web Sites Are Already Running, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES, A13 (November 18, 2006) (noting importance of use of domain names in future political 
campaigns, notably the 2008 presidential election).  
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domain name disputes.170  This is largely because of a failure to appropriately identify 
and categorize the competing classes of interests that need to be protected and balanced 
in the domain name system with respect to trademarks.171  Similar problems could be 
avoided in the political context with some regulatory forethought and planning. 
 
III.  POLITICIANS’ NAMES VS TRADEMARKS 
 
A.  “HILLARY.COM”:  A CASE STUDY 
 
The preceding discussion has argued in favor of identifying two specific 
categories of bad faith conduct involving domain names corresponding with politician’s 
names – political cybersquatting and political cyberfraud - and with developing 
appropriate legal responses to them.  However, one situation that can arise, albeit rarely, 
involving political domain names involves a coincidental cross-over between the 
commercial trademark system and the political system.  It concerns the situation where a 
commercial trademark interest happens to correspond with a politician’s name and both 
parties desire use of a corresponding domain name.  An obvious example could arise in 
the situation of the ‘hillary.com’ domain name.  Many people would think such a name 
would relate to Senator Hillary Clinton.  However, on typing the domain name into a web 
browser, one would find that the name resolves to a web page administered by a 
company, Hillary Software Inc, that appears to be a legitimate company with a 
corresponding trademark or business name. 
 
While this may be confusing in one sense for Internet users looking for the 
website of Senator Clinton, it is obviously – or at least apparently – not an attempt to 
hijack her name as a domain name to extort money from her for transfer of the name.  It 
is also not an attempt to provide any information about the senator under a relevant 
domain name.  It is, of course possible, that if Senator Clinton wanted that domain name 
for herself she might make an offer for the name to Hillary Software, but the company 
would be under no legal obligation to accept her offer, having seemingly legitimately 
registered a domain name corresponding with their business name and trademark and 
having used the name purely for their own commercial purposes in the software industry. 
 
                                                 
170
  See discussions in Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks, and the First Amendment:  
Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONNECTICUT L R 973 (2007); Jacqueline Lipton, Commerce vs 
Commentary:  Gripe Sites, Parody and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, forthcoming, WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY L R, 2007; Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting:  Taking Domain Names Past 
Trademark Policy, 40 WAKE FOREST L R 1361 (2005). 
 
171
  Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting:  Taking Domain Name Disputes Past Trademark 
Policy, 40 WAKE FOREST L R 1361, 1364 (2005) (“The time has come to develop some new approaches to 
domain name disputes that can take account of interests in domain names outside the bad-faith 
cybersquatting context.  This Article suggests a new classification scheme for different kinds of domain 
name disputes.  The new scheme can serve as the basis for the development of new approaches to Internet 
domain name dispute resolution …. [This article] identifies the kinds of competing social values that will 
likely need to be taken into account in future development of a more comprehensive approach to domain 
name dispute resolution.”) 
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Presuming that the registrants of ‘hillary.com’ have registered and used the name 
in good faith for their own business purposes, they will not have contravened any existing 
laws based on protecting trademark rights in corresponding Internet domain names.  This 
will be the case whether or not Senator Clinton is regarded as having a trademarked or 
trademarkable personal name.172  In any event, trademarked or not, and registered as a 
mark or not, Senator Clinton could not likely establish trademark infringement173 by 
Hillary Software because of the lack of consumer confusion.174  It is unlikely that web 
users looking for information about Senator Clinton and her policies would think that the 
Hillary Software website had anything to do with her.  It is possible she might argue what 
has come to be called ‘initial interest confusion’: that is, where consumers are initially 
confused on reaching a website and are then diverted from pursuing their original search 
object.175  However, again, it is unlikely that Internet users seeking information about 
Senator Clinton would find information about a software firm to be a sufficient diversion 
to deter them from searching from Senator Clinton’s actual website. 
 
Senator Clinton would additionally be unlikely to establish an infringement of the 
ACPA provisions protecting personal names176 because such an action would require that 
                                                 
172
  Generally, personal names are not registrable as trademarks:  15 U.S.C. § 1052 (c).  See also 
GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, ¶ 2.03[d].  However, even unregistered marks can in 
some cases attain a common law trademark status.  In fact, when Senator Clinton brought an arbitration 
proceeding under the UDRP against the original registrant of ‘hillaryclinton.com’, the arbitrator found that 
Senator Clinton did have common law trademark rights in the ‘Hillary Clinton’ mark which corresponded 
to the ‘hillaryclinton.com’ domain name:  National Arbitration Forum, Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele 
Dinoia a/k/a SZL.com (Claim No. FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005).  The arbitrator ordered a transfer 
of the name to Senator Clinton largerly on this basis.  However, that arbitration was undefended and there 
was no evidence that the registrant of the domain name was using it for any legitimate purpose, unlike 
potentially the registrant of ‘hillary.com’. 
 
173
  15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1). 
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  15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1)(A).  This is perhaps similar to the results that occur in cases involving 
competing legitimate interests in trademarks where only one associated domain name is available.  See, for 
example, Hasbro, Inc v Clue Computing Inc, 66 F Supp 2d 117 (D. Mass. 1999) in which Hasbro failed to 
show consumer confusion for trademark infringement purposes with respect to the use of the ‘clue.com’ 
domain name registered to a company called Clue Computing, Inc.  Despite Hasbro’s registration of the 
Clue trademark for its popular board game of the same name, it was unable to establish that the use of the 
clue.com domain name by Clue Computing was confusing Hasbro’s consumers as to the source or origin of 
relevant goods or services. 
 
175
  Even though Internet users would not necessarily be confused once they arrived at the site they 
were not actually searching for, courts have been prepared to find the ‘consumer confusion’ requirement of 
trademark infringement law made out on the basis of the notion of ‘initial interest confusion’.  See, for 
example, Brookfield Communications Inc v West Coast Entertainment Corp, 174 F 3d 1036, 1054-1064 (9th 
Cir 19999); Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 
507, 559 (‘[Initial interest confusion] lacks a rigorous definition, a clear policy justification, and a uniform 
standard for analyzing claims.  With its doctrinal flexibility, [it] has become the tool of choice for plaintiffs 
to shut down junior users who have not actually engaged in misappropriative uses.”; Panavision Int’l v 
Toeppen, 141 F 3d 1316 (9th Cir., 1998) (consumers would not actually have been confused as to source by 
defendant’s website, but may have been distracted from finding the plaintiff’s actual web presence).  
 
176
  15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A). 
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the corresponding domain name had been registered with ‘the specific intent to profit 
from such name by selling the domain name for financial gain to that person or any third 
party’.177  Assuming that Hillary Software did not register its ‘hillary.com’ name for this 
purpose, it is unlikely to run afoul of this provision. 
 
Senator Clinton would also be unlikely to succeed against the registrant of 
‘hillary.com’ in a UDRP arbitration because the registrant could likely demonstrate its 
legitimate use of the domain name under the UDRP criteria.178  In particular, the 
registrant appears to be using the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of 
computer software services.179  For similar reasons, it is unlikely that Hillary Software 
has run afoul of the various state laws, notably the California laws, relating to unfair 
business practices180 and political cyberfraud,181 assuming of course these laws could 
apply to Internet conduct affecting a New York senator.  If there is no bad faith for the 
purposes of the unfair business laws182 and no willful intent to deceive electors under the 
cyberfraud legislation,183 these actions would not likely succeed.  Further, if there is no 
content about Senator Clinton on the relevant website, as indeed there is not in the case of 
‘hillary.com’, proceedings under defamation or celebrity tort laws by Senator Clinton 
would be unlikely to succeed.184   
 
It is possible that Senator Clinton could succeed in a trademark dilution action,185 
presuming she has a trademark interest here.186  Such an action is premised on the notion 
of tarnishment or blurring of a mark.187  In other words, decreasing the ability of a mark 
                                                 
177
  15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A). 
 
178
  UDRP, ¶4(c). 
 
179
  UDRP, ¶4(c)(i). 
 
180
  California’s Business and Professions Code, § 17525(a). 
 
181
  Cal. Elec. Code, §§ 18320-23 (Deering Supp. 2005). 
 
182
  California’s Business and Professions Code, § 17525(a). 
 
183
  Cal. Elec. Code, §§ 18320-23 (Deering Supp. 2005). 
 
184
  This is because these actions are premised on comments about the plaintiff in the case of 
defamation, or attempts to usurp the commercial value of a celebrity’s persona in the case of the celebrity 
tort.  See discussion in Part ___ supra. 
 
185
  15 U.S.C. §§1125(c)(1), 1127. 
 
186
  Although personal names are not generally trademarkable (GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION 
AND PRACTICE, ¶ 2.03[d]), a UDRP panel did find the senator to have a common law trademark interest in 
‘Hillary Clinton’:  Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia a/k/a SZL.com (Claim No. 
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005).  It is not clear whether this would extend to protection of ‘Hillary’ as 
a mark per se.  Further, the UDRP panel’s comments would not be binding on a domestic court or even a 
later arbitration panel. 
 
187
  15 U.S.C. §§1125(c)(1), 1127. 
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to operate as a mark and identify relevant goods and services.  The problem with dilution 
law is that it is premised on the notion that the underlying mark be famous188 and be used 
in connection with the sale of goods or services.189  It is not clear that Senator Clinton’s 
personal name would qualify on either count, although it is possible. 
 
Is the answer for politicians, particularly those considering a presidential run, to 
register all relevant permutations of their personal names as domain names as quickly as 
possible190 and hope that no legitimate trademark holders have beaten them to it?  At 
least a politician who registers the name first might have more of a chance if a 
corresponding trademark holder later complains about the registration, particularly if the 
politician, like Senator Clinton could establish some form of common law trademark 
rights in her own name,191 or at least lack of bad faith in the registration and use of the 
name. 
 
This practical ‘get in first’ solution would remedy potential cyberfraud and 
cybersquatting concerns as well.  However, it is obviously not very practical.  For one 
thing, politicians – and prospective politicians - do not always know if and when they are 
likely to enter a political campaign and it seems unnecessarily distracting to expect them 
to vigilantly register every possible permutation of their personal name in a domain space 
at all times for avoidance of later problems – or at least the most obvious permutations of 
their name.192  For another thing, politicians do not always want to advertise their 
prospective political ambitions with such registrations – as registration information is 
generally publicly available on ‘whois’ searches.193   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
188
  id. 
 
189
  id. 
 
190
  See discussion in Steve Friess, As Candidates Mull ’08, Web Sites Are Already Running, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES, A13 (November 18, 2006). 
 
191
  When Senator Clinton brought an arbitration proceeding under the UDRP against the original 
registrant of ‘hillaryclinton.com’, the arbitrator found that Senator Clinton did have common law trademark 
rights in the ‘Hillary Clinton’ mark which corresponded to the ‘hillaryclinton.com’ domain name:  National 
Arbitration Forum, Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia a/k/a SZL.com (Claim No. 
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005).  The arbitrator ordered a transfer of the name to Senator Clinton 
largerly on this basis.  However, that arbitration was undefended and there was no evidence that the 
registrant of the domain name was using it for any legitimate purpose, unlike potentially the registrant of 
‘hillary.com’. 
 
192
  For example, Senator Clinton may be much more interested in ensuring that an unauthorized party 
does not register ‘hillary.com’ and ‘hillaryclinton.com’ as opposed to the perhaps less intuitive names like 
‘hillary2008.com’ which is apparently registered to a Mr Brett Maverick of Canberra, Australia (Steve 
Friess, As Candidates Mull ’08, Web Sites Are Already Running, THE NEW YORK TIMES, A13 (November 
18, 2006)) and ‘hrc2008.com’ which is currently registered to a company called Address Creation, LLC – 
which may well be a cybersquatter (see http://www.whois.net/whois_new.cgi?d=hrc2008.com&tld=com, 
last viewed on March 15, 2007). 
 
193
  See, for example, ‘WHOIS.NET’ which is a database of domain name registry information (last 
viewed on March 15, 2007 and available at http://www.whois.net/ ). 
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B.  POLITICIANS VS LEGITIMATE TRADEMARK OWNERS:  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
 
There are other more workable solutions to conflicts between politicians and 
legitimate trademark holders with interests in the same domain name, particularly in the 
electoral context.  One solution would be a temporary compulsory licensing system under 
which a politician could exercise rights in the name in the lead up to an election, and the 
name could thereafter revert to the legitimate trademark holder.194  This could be 
administered through domestic legislation or through the private administration and 
dispute resolution proceedings of the domain name system.  The latter might be easier 
and would only involve adopting a simple dispute resolution scheme like the UDRP, to 
be implemented in a similar way through contract with domain name registrants.  The 
difference would be that it would require domain name arbitrators to make 
determinations as to who has a better right to a given domain name in the lead up to an 
election.  It would also need to give such arbitrators the power to order a temporary 
licensing measure in favor of a politician.  The trademark holder would receive a set 
royalty fee for the use of the name during the license period, so this would be some 
compensation for losing the commercial use of the name and may deter politicians from 
arbitrating for names they do not really need.  However, these kinds of arrangements may 
cause problems for the trademark owner wanting to use the relevant site.  A temporary 
license in favor of the politician may be problematic as disrupting the business of the 
commercial trademark holder.  Also, the politician may want to maintain the site after the 
election.195  At this point, should she be forced to buy the name from the trademark 
holder for a reasonable market price?196 
 
In any event, even without a licensing system in place, these kinds of disputes 
would likely only arise in rare cases and some politicians may not care about all 
commercial registrations of domain names corresponding with their personal names 
provided that relevant websites do not include any misleading comments about their 
campaigns and that other intuitive domain names are available for their campaigns.  
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  Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting:  Taking Domain Name Disputes Past Trademark 
Policy, 40 WAKE FOREST LR 1361, 1433-1435 (suggesting a compulsory licensing scheme or domain name 
sharing scheme for political domain names). 
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  For example, Senator John Kerry has maintained his johnkerry.com website (last viewed on 
March 15, 2007) subsequent to the 2004 presidential election to communicate with the electorate and, 
presumably, with the thought that he may again run for president in the future. 
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  Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting:  Taking Domain Name Disputes Past Trademark 
Policy, 40 WAKE FOREST L R 1361, 1434 (2005) (There might … be situations in which a political 
candidate wants to retain a domain name past a temporary licensing period …. In such cases, provisions 
might be made for the compulsory license to continue until one or both parties to the license loses interest 
in, or use for, the domain name in question.  Alternatively, if a particularly long-term license appears to be 
developing due to ongoing circumstances in which the name is potentially useful to both parties, provision 
might be built into the relevant scheme for a final sale of the name, assuming a fair market price could be 
reached between the parties.”) 
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Again, Senator Clinton may be a good example here.  She may not care that Hillary 
Software is using the ‘hillary.com’ name for legitimate commercial purposes as long as 
they do not allow that name to be used for purposes that might impugn her campaign 
messages in a misleading way, and provided that she herself can use another equally 
intuitive domain name such as ‘hillaryclinton.com’.   
 
Another potential solution for the rare case of a conflict between a trademark 
holder and a politician over a domain name could be a ‘domain name sharing’ order.  
This could be achieved in exactly the same procedural manner as the domain name 
licensing arrangement suggested supra, but the administrative order could require the 
politician and the trademark holder to share the relevant domain name rather than for the 
trademark holder to license it to the politician.  This would be an arrangement under 
which the domain name in question resolved to a page simply containing hyperlinks to 
the relevant websites: in this case, one hyperlink to the commercial trademark holder’s 
website and the other to the politician’s website.  This kind of arrangement is 
technologically possible with current Internet technologies and may create a fairer and 
more efficient balance between commercial speech and political speech in these rare 
cases.  It may also deter registration of political domain names under ‘sham’ business 
names that look on their face like legitimate uses, but are really set up in the hope of 
extorting money from a politician for transfer of the name: in other words, another form 
of political cybersquatting.   
 
It may also have some application in the rare case of a conflict between a 
politician and another person with a similar personal name: for example, if a private 
citizen shared a name like Chris Dodd or Joe Biden with a politician.  In the absence of a 
trademark interest in either name, it may be that sharing the name is a viable option.  In 
the absence of a sharing – or perhaps licensing – arrangement in this scenario, 
presumably the ‘first come, first served’ rule under the domain name registration system 
would govern.  The Lanham Act provisions, including the ACPA, are limited to bad faith 
conduct with respect to domain names relating to trademarks197 and personal names,198 as 
is the UDRP.199  If the private citizen had registered the name first and was not making 
bad faith use of the name, presumably she would be safe from an ACPA or UDRP 
challenge.  This is where a sharing or licensing scheme may be particularly useful.  
Alternatively, a rule could be developed for these cases at the local or international level 
that the use of the name within the political process ‘outranks’ the use of the name for a 
private individual in order to maximize the communicative potential of the Internet in an 
electoral context.   
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
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  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i). 
 
198
  15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A). 
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  UDRP, clause 4(a), 4(c)(ii). 
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The use of domain names and associated web content will increase in the political 
context in coming years.  The Internet is an unprecedented communications medium in 
terms of being an incredibly low cost method of reaching a tremendously large audience.  
As more and more people are connected to the Internet, and as politicians and their 
campaign managers become more and more conversant with its potential, the problems 
faced by politicians in terms of bad faith conduct involving Internet domain names will 
also magnify.  That is why it is imperative to start thinking about how the Internet in 
general, and the domain name system in particular, should be regulated in the political 
context as soon as possible.  Although some thought has been given to questions of 
domain name regulation in the context of commercial trademark disputes,200 little thought 
has been given to the protection of domain names used in politics.  The particular issues 
raised in politics merit independent debate and perhaps specifically targeted solutions. 
 
Some people may argue that the use of domain names in politics is simply part of 
a larger picture about regulating the Internet more broadly.  There are several answers to 
this.  While it may be true that much about the Internet in general, and the domain name 
system in particular, needs to be examined from a regulatory perspective at this point in 
time, there is something very special about the political process in a representative 
democracy that may well require separate attention.  The electoral process is fundamental 
to our system of government, and the ability to disseminate and receive important 
information about politics and politicians in an electoral context is key to the functioning 
of our system.  The need for electors and politicians to have every chance to fully 
participate in the political process both as recipients and disseminators of relevant 
information is of prime importance here.  Thus, the operation of the domain name system 
as a directory for such information must be facilitated by the legal system to the 
maximum extent possible. 
 
The use of domain names as guides to relevant information about politicians, 
particularly in an electoral context, also points to an answer to a second possible criticism 
of the approach advocated in this article to political domain name regulation.  Some 
would argue that focusing on the regulation of domain names at all misses the point of 
what needs to be regulated on the Internet.  Commentators have noted in the past that 
search engines are now taking on prime importance as ways to navigate the Internet and 
that, as a result, the use of easy-to-remember domain names is less important than in the 
past.201  While this may well be true as a general proposition, this argument only 
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  Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks, and the First Amendment:  Searching for 
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engine instead of entering domain names into the address bar.  For some searchers, search engines have 
supplanted DNS’s core search function of delivering known websites.  In turn, top search engine 
placements have eclipsed domain names as the premier Internet locations.”) 
 
 POLITICAL SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE 
  51 
considers one perspective – the ability of sophisticated search engines to find information 
as a result of a particular search query.  In other words, while search engines clearly assist 
with information location, regardless of domain name, they do not necessarily help with 
the identificatory function played by many Internet domain names.   
 
As with titles of books, songs and movies, Internet domain names serve at least 
two functions.  One is to describe the content of the underlying work or, in the case of a 
domain name, the underlying web content.  The other is to serve almost as a label to 
identify the work.202  This enables people to refer to the relevant work (or, in the domain 
name case, web page) by name when talking to others about it.  It is clearly easier for me 
to refer a friend to, say, ‘factcheck.org’ by referring to its domain name than by referring 
to its general content or the search steps I took to locate it using a particular search 
engine.203  Even when search engines are used to locate a relevant web page, some 
research suggests that web users will often remember domain names in any event and 
simply type them into a search engine rather than a web browser.204  This is further 
evidence that the actual domain name retains its importance even when users increasingly 
rely on search engines to locate web content.  Additionally, even in the search engine 
context, many search engines will prioritize web pages with relevant domain names, 
depending on the search algorithms used.  Thus, domain names will retain their 
importance, despite the rise of increasingly sophisticated search engine technologies. 
 
Thus, the regulation of domain names within the global information society is 
likely to maintain an important place in future debates about Internet governance 
generally.  As described throughout this article, the electoral process raises specific issues 
relating to domain names that are not clearly dealt with by the current regulatory system, 
and are not really at the forefront of current debate, although they should be.  This article 
has been concerned with three distinct classes of conduct, all of which have raised some 
concerns in the political process.  However, to date, these classes of conduct have not yet 
been clearly categorized or examined with respect to the specific issues they raise for the 
political process and the domain name system.   
 
Ultimately, resolving some of these issues may be a part of incidentally resolving 
some other domain name questions relating to the protection of personal names in the 
                                                 
202
  Jacqueline Lipton, Commerce vs Commentary:  Gripe Sites, Parody and the First Amendment in 
Cyberspace, forthcoming, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY L R, 2007. 
 
203
  Although, ironically, it was not so easy for Vice President Cheney to refer to this website in the 
Vice Presidential debate in the lead-up to the 2004 presidential election.  He mistakenly referred to 
‘factcheck.com’ when he intended to refer to ‘factcheck.org’, and people who looked up ‘factcheck.com’ 
were redirected to George Soros’ anti-President-Bush website.  See Harry Chen, Is the Domain Name .Com 
or .Org?  Dick Cheney was Confused, HARRY CHEN THINKS ALOUD (last viewed on March 13, 2007 and 
available at:  http://harry.hchen1.com/2004/10/06/89). 
  
204
  Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L J, 507, 548 
(2005) (“Some searchers, frustrated with the DNS’s low relevancy or adverse consequences, like 
typosquatting, porn-napping, and mousetrapping, may have become trained to start every search at a search 
engine instead of entering domain names into the address bar.”) 
 
 POLITICAL SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE 
  52 
domain space more generally.205  The ACPA provisions relating to the protection of 
personal names against bad faith cybersquatting206 are a good example of a law 
concerned with a broader question that may incidentally protect some politician’s names 
against certain classes of bad faith conduct online.  Nevertheless, the development of 
regulations protecting personal names generally has not been a priority of the 
international legal community, although there are some domestic examples of laws in this 
area.207  Domain name conflicts involving politicians’ names and campaigns may require 
more speedy attention than has been the case to date.  Their resolution is certainly more 
important than resolving issues concerning personal names that do not affect the political 
process in any significant way.  This is because of the fundamental importance of the 
political process and the exponentially increasing use of the Internet in the political 
context. 
 
There are undoubtedly problems relating to domain names in politics that have 
not been canvassed in any detail within this article.  Intentional ‘mis-spellings’ of 
politician’s names within domain names, for example, have only been incidentally 
addressed here.  This is because they largely raise the same issues as accurate spellings of 
politicians’ names in the domain space and should be separated out into relevant 
categories of conduct as such.  A deliberate misspelling of Senator Obama’s name for the 
purposes of cybersquatting, for example, should be treated in the same way as an accurate 
spelling of his name.  Thus, a person who registered, say, ‘www.barakobama.com’ in the 
hope of extorting money from Senator Obama for transfer of the name to him, should be 
subject to any rules developed to protect against a cybersquatter who had registered 
‘www.barackobama.com’ with a similar purpose.208  By the same token, anyone who 
registered the misspelling with the intention of making false and defamatory comments 
about the senator might be subject both to defamation law in terms of the content and to a 
cyberfraud regulation of the kind described in this article in terms of the association of 
the false content with the domain name. 
 
The main aim of this article has been to attempt to focus some of the future debate 
on Internet governance on the issue of protecting political names in the domain space.  
The key point is that the current system does not adequately protect politician’s names in 
the domain space against various forms of bad faith conduct.  Current regulatory 
measures focusing largely, as they do, on protecting commercial trademark interests in 
cyberspace do not effectively facilitate political discourse through appropriate and 
effective use of the domain name system.  In order to address the problems raised by the 
current system, it is first necessary to categorize the problems, as this article has 
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attempted to do, and then to moot potential solutions to them.  Hopefully the above 
discussion has provided some useful first steps in this direction, and the debate over 
Internet governance can in the future better accommodate the needs of the modern 
political process. 
 
 
